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I. Project Overview

A. Freedom of Information in a Developing Nation
Ghana, a nation of 25 million in West Africa,1 is fiercely proud of its political history.
The first Sub-Saharan African nation to achieve independence from colonialism, Ghana has
been a constitutional democracy since 1992.2 Since that time, there have been six
presidential and parliamentary elections, with two peaceful transitions of power from one
party to another.3 The 1992 Constitution creates a democratic political system and protects
a litany of personal liberties and freedoms, including freedom of speech, religion, assembly,
and press.4
Not only is Ghana one of Africa’s most stable democracies, it also has one of the
continent’s most successful economies. GDP growth routinely eclipses that of other African
nations.5 Worldwide, Ghana is renowned for its cocoa and gold exports,6 and its economic
growth has been aided by the recent discovery of oil.7 Indeed, “Ghana has been lauded
internationally by the IMF and the World Bank as a ‘flagship’ of success.”8
Still, developmental problems remain. While per capita income is roughly $400$450 per year,9 80 percent of Ghana’s population subsists on less than $1.00 a day.10 Forty-

1 GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., POPULATION BY REGION, DISTRICT, LOCALITY OF RESIDENCE, AGE GROUPS AND SEX, 2010 (Oct.

2010), available at http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/population_by_region_district_locality_of_
residence_age_groups_and_sex,_2010.pdf.
2 RACHEL NAYOR, GHANA: AN OXFAM COUNTRY PROFILE 18, 30 (2003).
3 Peter Arthur, Democratic Consolidation in Ghana: The Role and Contribution of the Media, Civil Society and
State Institutions, 48(2) COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 203, 207–09 (April 2010).
4 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 21.
5 Ghana Overview, THE WORLD BANK (April 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ghana/overview.
6 NAYOR, supra note 2, at 6.
7 Ghana: Oil Activity Rising, OXFORD BUSINESS GROUP (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/ghana-oil-activity-rising;
8 NAYOR, supra note 2, at 25.
9 GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., GHANA LIVING STANDARDS SURVEY, REPORT OF THE FIFTH ROUND (GLSS 5) viii (Sept. 2008),
available at http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/glss5_report.pdf.
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six percent of Ghanaians do not participate in the workforce.11 One third of all Ghanaians
sleep under an insecticide-treated net to prevent malaria,12 and one fifth have no formal
education.13 While 77 percent of men are literate, only 63 percent of women are.14
Accusations of corruption, especially in regards to Ghana’s newfound oil wealth, are
rampant.15
Ghana’s continuing commitment to free speech and a free press plays a critical role
in resolving these issues of poverty, resource allocation, healthcare, and educational
opportunity. The freedom to acquire and share information is necessary both for
democracy and for economic development. Media freedom enables journalists to serve as a
watchdog against government corruption and relay important information to the
electorate.16 Moreover, freedom of speech and economic development “expand[] the real
freedoms that people enjoy,” and are thus part of the same path of progress for a
developing nation.17 Fully realizing the freedom to acquire and share information is thus an
essential part of the nation’s economic and political developmental goals.

B. Class Objective and Overview

Id. at 105–06.
Id. at 34.
12 GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., 2008 GHANA DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY (GDHS): KEY FINDINGS 12 (2008),
available at http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/SR172/SR172.pdf.
13 Id. at 2.
14 Id.
15 E.g., Laura Burke, Corruption, Oil Hot Issues in Ghana Election, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Nov. 22, 2012),
http://www.voanews.com/content/corruption-oil-hot-issues-in-ghana-election/1551149.html; Rawlings
Accuses Mills of Stealing Oil Money, GHANA WEB (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=207126; William Wallis et al.,
Corruption Probe into Sale of Ghana Oil Block, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/28ed19fc-fbca-11de-9c29-00144feab49a.html#axzz2RhBXc3tE.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 45–46.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 52–55.
10
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In January 2013, ten students18 and Professor Joseph Blocher from Duke University
School of Law organized a seminar to study legal, political, and cultural issues relating to
freedom of speech, the press, and other media in Ghana. The seminar was the fourth
iteration of international seminars initiated by Professor Laurence R. Helfer, the codirector of Duke Law School’s Center for International and Comparative Law and a member
of the faculty steering committee of the Duke Center on Human Rights. Previous seminars
had focused on property rights in Brazil, Israel, and Ghana.
The seminar met weekly for two months in Durham, North Carolina, focusing on
Ghanaian law, history, culture, politics, and the present state of press freedom and media
proliferation in Ghana. Students analyzed the Ghanaian Constitution and proposed freedom
of information and broadcasting laws, read firsthand accounts of journalists’ experiences in
Ghana, followed Ghanaian news sources in their coverage of political and social
developments, and discussed academic literature written by Ghanaian lawyers and
scholars. Particular attention was placed on the relationship between the government and
both state-owned and private media, media penetration into rural areas, and the use of
media for development purposes.19
The fieldwork portion of the seminar lasted ten days and included meetings in
Accra, Cape Coast, Ada, and Dogo. Students met with various stakeholders with unique
perspectives on press freedom in Ghana. This included journalists from state-owned and
private media outlets, government representatives from the National Media Commission

The students were Jacob Charles, Colleen Healy, Christopher Jones, Ellie Marranzini, Jonathan Nussbaum,
Lauren Ross, all of the Duke Law class of 2013, and Nick Brod, Nina Gupta, Hyatt Howard, and Ndidi Menkiti,
all of the class of 2014.
19 A full list of the works consulted by the seminar class before departing for Ghana is attached in Appendix II.

18
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and Parliament, and lawyers and educators from the University of Ghana, the GIMPA Law
School, and the Ghana School of Law.20 The Media Foundation for West Africa, headed by
Kwame Karikari, served as the primary in-country partner.

C. Purpose of Written Work
This work product summarizes the findings of the Ghana seminar and analyzes
current attempts to more fully realize media freedom in Ghana. Two attempts in particular,
the proposed Right to Information Bill (RTI) and Broadcast Bill, are central to legal reform
and media freedom, and thus receive extensive attention here.
The analysis here is greatly informed by, and indeed would not be possible without,
the insights shared by our partners and interviewees in Ghana. Their generosity and
insights form the core of this Report. And while each of those partners is truly the expert in
his or her field, our hope as disinterested outsiders is to synthesize their insights, offering
an analysis that incorporates multiple points of view. This Report was therefore written
with our Ghanaian partners and interviewees in mind. The Report combines what we have
learned from them, and from our own research. It offers a framework for conceptualizing
how free speech and press advance democratic and economic development, analyzes
recent legislative proposals for both accessing and disseminating information, and offers
recommendations on how to more fully realize the freedoms of speech and press enshrined
in the Ghanaian constitution.

20

A full list of the Ghanaian organizations and representatives met with is attached in Appendix I.
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II. Summary of Findings
This Report begins by showing that free speech and free press are crucial for a
developing nation. In an immediate sense, both freedom of press and freedom of speech are
guaranteed by the Ghanaian Constitution.21 More broadly, promoting freedom of press and
of speech is an essential element of promoting democracy. The progress Ghana’s
democracy has made since the 1992 Constitution can be attributed in part to freedom of
speech and press, and those values can continue to safeguard the democratic process.
Moreover, a free and robust press can root out the kind of government corruption that
hinders national development.
A detailed history of speech and media in Ghana both demonstrates the practical
importance of these freedoms and sets the stage for current debates about how best to
protect them. Many media outlets in Ghana, especially those owned by the state, predate
the 1992 Constitution. These institutions now compete with a private press that has
flourished since the country’s democratization. Legal reforms, including Article 162 of the
Constitution, guarantee a free and independent media.22 Many restrictive pre-1992 media
laws, including the criminal libel statute, survived the governmental transition but have
since been repealed. Nonetheless, impediments such as laws that criminalize “causing fear
and alarm” or “scandalizing the court” remain in place.23

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, arts. 21, 162.
Id. art. 162.
23 Interview with Nene Amegatcher, President, Ghana Bar Ass’n, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 15, 2013).
21

22
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Residual Legal Impediments to Free Expression in Ghana
This Report focuses on two major aspects of media freedom and free expression, but other troubling legal barriers
remain:
• First, the offense of scandalizing the court—which allows judges to hold their critics in criminal contempt—raises
serious concerns about the constitutional right of citizens to question government officials. Though the contempt
power itself is conferred by article 162(2) of the 1992 Constitution, the employment of this potent tool to silence
critics in Republic v. Mensa Bonsu led one dissenting justice to wisely observe that in a democracy “courts must
have regard to the right of every person to express himself freely and openly on all matters of public concern
whether pertaining to the actions of the executive, the legislature or the judiciary.”
• Second, section 208 of the Criminal Offences Act, which criminalizes false publications “likely to cause fear and
alarm to the public or disturb the public peace,” predicates criminal liability on an unacceptably vague standard,
which invites arbitrary enforcement and application.
• Third, the law granting presidential access to state-owned media on demand leaves insufficient space for
independent editorial decision-making and creates the appearance of government control and bias.
• Fourth, and finally, the remaining civil libel laws—which have involved journalists in 90% of recent cases—risk
chilling robust free speech unless they are sparingly employed and make ample provision for reasonable defenses
by members of the media acting in good faith.

Fully overcoming the residual legal impediments to free expression in Ghana means
safeguarding the ability to acquire information and the freedom to share that information.
Both are integral to the operation of a robust public sphere. Two proposed pieces of
legislation, the Right to Information (RTI) Bill and the Broadcast Bill, seek to address these
two components of media freedom.
The RTI Bill is designed to implement the broad right to information promised in
the Ghanaian Constitution,24 It creates a procedure for obtaining information from various
government agencies and qualifies what types of information citizens are entitled to.
However, in many ways the Bill falls short of securing the full freedom to information
needed in Ghanaian society.

24

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 21(1)(f).

9

The proposals for a Broadcast Bill seek to regulate the national airwaves for both
radio and television. In a country where most citizens get their news from radio,25 this is
potentially a far-reaching piece of legislation. Yet the Bill fails to take into account many
new developments in radio technology, leaving serious barriers for the free transmission of
information by the Ghanaian media.
This Report discusses these proposed pieces of legislation in turn. By analyzing their
purposes, structures, and likely effects, the Report can illuminate current attempts to more
fully realize media freedom within the broader context of democratic and economic
development in Ghana.

Jonathan Temin & Daniel A. Smith, Media Matters: Evaluating the Role of the Media in Ghana’s 2000
Elections, 101 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 585, 602 (2002).

25
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III. Free Speech and Development: Contemporary and Historical Context

A. The Role of Free Speech in Democratic and Economic Development
In the words of Bright Blewu, President of the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA),
press freedom is critical to the functioning of a democratic society because it “promote[s]
free transmission of information” and “lend[s] a voice to the voiceless.”26 This statement
captures the importance of a democratic right to both receive information and
communicate that information.27 Key stakeholders representing state-owned, private, and
community media outlets agree that robust individual and collective speech rights facilitate
public participation28 and ensure government transparency and accountability.29 Yaw
Boadu-Ayeboafoh, General Manager of Newspapers at the Daily Graphic, predicts that these
democratic outcomes will help to create a Ghanaian society that is more respectful of
human rights.30

Interview with Bright Blewu, President, Ghana Journalists Ass’n, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 11, 2013).
See Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”), art. 9,
June 26, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
28 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, Co-founder, Ghana Cmty. Radio Network, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 11, 2013)
(emphasizing the importance of public participation by marginalized communities because the “right to
communicate” encompasses a right “to not just express your opinion but to have it taken into account”).
29 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, Gen. Manager of Newspapers, Graphic Comm. Grp. Ltd., in Accra,
Ghana (Mar. 12, 2013) (advocating for freedom of information legislation because it will (1) create an
environment that is more open and transparent, (2) allow Ghanaians to challenge authorities openly in court,
and (3) subject judicial action to public discussion); Interview with Gina Ama Blay, C.E.O., Western
Publications, Ltd., in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 11, 2013) (explaining that the role of the private press is to ensure
accountability and transparency of government by reporting from the independent perspective of one who is
not “in bed with government”).
30 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29.
26

27
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These stakeholders’ statements reflect a national commitment to free speech, free
press, and other “participatory freedoms”31 enshrined in Ghana’s 1992 Constitution as well
as numerous international human rights instruments and the constitutions of democratic
nations throughout the world. Specifically, Article 21 of the Ghanaian Constitution provides
for “freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other
media” as well as freedom of information.32 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression,”
including freedom “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers.”33 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of
which Ghana is a signatory, protects a nearly identical right.34 In addition, the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “Banjul Charter”) provides for an individual
right to receive information and express and disseminate opinions.35 Ghana ratified the
Banjul Charter in 1989 and signed it in 2004.36
Free speech has long been recognized in Ghanaian society as “an inviolable
fundamental human right that cannot be suppressed.”37 Traditional maxims depict speech
as an instinct that cannot be suppressed without causing agony to the speaker.38 Though

The term “participatory freedoms” is used in this Report to refer to individual and collective freedoms that
influence public discussion and social interactions, including freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of expression, and freedom of information. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 9 (1999).
32 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 21(1).
33 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71,
UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
34 International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
35 Banjul Charter, supra note 27, art. 9.
36 Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
37 KWESI YANKAH, FREE SPEECH IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: THE CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATION IN
CONTEMPORARY GHANA 12 (1998).
38 Id. at 13.
31
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cultural norms and verbal taboos in traditional societies often dictated “the nature and
style of communication in the face of authority,”39 other traditional practices, such as
festivals of free speech, demonstrate “a highly cherished democratic ideal of free
expression.”40
Despite widespread recognition of the intrinsic value of participatory freedoms,
however, it is frequently argued that civil and political rights are “luxuries” of democracy
that cannot be supported until “the development process has borne enough fruit.”41 This
argument prioritizes the national interest in economic development over individual
political and civil liberties. When applied to speech and press freedom specifically, media
becomes an instrument for development and a tool for government programs, rather than
a critical watchdog.42 “Developmental journalism,” as it is frequently referred to in practice
and in academic literature, promotes national unification and education rather than
fostering public debate and discourse.43 It is a concept that seems to be particularly
common in postcolonial developing nations.44
This vision of the relationship between journalism and development is unduly
narrow, robbing value from each. Sacrificing participatory freedoms in the name of
development fails to give due regard to their intrinsic value. Moreover, this tradeoff

Id. at 25.
Id. at 23. Festivals of free speech were “days on which social norms [were] frozen” and “the deeds of rulers
and elders [were] brought into the open forum … and critically assessed in order to check the extent to which
they promote[d] the people’s collective aspirations over the past year.” Id. at 20–21.
41 SEN, supra note 31, at 35 (describing and criticizing this conception).
42 See H. KWASI PREMPEH, GHANA CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC DEV., CONST. REV. SERIES NO. 3, REFORMING THE CONSTITUTION
OF GHANA FOR A NEW ERA: AVERTING THE PERIL OF A CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM 4, 14–17 (2009)
(describing threat of an “imperial presidency” in Ghana).
43 JENNIFER HASTY, THE PRESS AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN GHANA 11 (2005).
44 SEN, supra note 31, at 13–14.
39

40
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underestimates both the instrumental role of participatory freedoms in promoting
democracy and the role of democracy in promoting economic development.
A robust media, which is dependent upon participatory freedoms, enhances
democracy in at least three important ways. First, a
robust media serves as a “watchdog on the

Ghana in Context

government” by exposing official action to public
scrutiny.45 In addition to increasing the likelihood that
public corruption will be exposed, government
awareness of the media’s watchful eye enhances
transparency and discourages public corruption.46
Second, media provides a platform for communication
between a government and its constituents. This

Ghana is one of the most stable and
free countries in all of Africa, and
particularly in West Africa. The
Freedom House, a U.S.-based
nonprofit, ranks countries annually
based on the political rights and
civil liberties that their citizens
enjoy. In 2013, Ghana scored a one
(the highest) of seven in the
political-rights and a two in the
civil-liberties category. Only 22%
of Sub-Saharan African countries
earned a “free” ranking on this
index. In 2012, Ghana was one of
only five Sub-Saharan African
countries to earn a “free” ranking in
press freedom.

function is extremely important because “the majority
[is] in the periphery when it comes to politics and
democracy” while government officials “wield the power and form the core of society
though they are in the minority.”47 Because democracy derives its authority and legitimacy
from public participation,48 good governance requires bilateral communication between
the majority and minority. The media serves this need by informing the government of the
periphery’s needs and alerting the periphery of the government’s activities.49 Finally,
public discussion of official action increases public officials’ accountability to their
Joe Brandford Nylnah, Democracy and the Journalist’s Role, in STATE OF THE MEDIA IN GHANA 40 (Freidrich
Ebert Stiftung, ed. 1994).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 38–39.
48 See SEN, supra note 31, at 31.
49 Nylnah, supra note 45, at 38–39.
45
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constituents. The media’s ability to deliver accurate, unbiased, and complete information to
the electorate both during and after elections determines voters’ ability to make informed
choices.50 In Ghana, for example, commentators largely seem to agree that the media’s
performance in this regard has improved with each election.51
Perhaps more frequently underestimated is the role of democracy in promoting
development. Many definitions of the term “development” focus narrowly on particular
(and sometimes controversial) methods for enhancing substantive freedom such as
industrialization, social modernization, or liberalization of markets.52 These definitions fail
to recognize “the ends that make development important,” and instead focus on “the means
that . . . play a prominent part in the process.”53 If attention is drawn to the goals of
development rather than the means, development might be more broadly defined as “a
process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.”54 According to this definition,
development is achieved through “removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well
as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of
public facilities as well as intolerance or inactivity of repressive states.”55
Participatory freedoms are inextricable from the overall goal of expanding
substantive freedoms for two main reasons. First, political and civil rights provide an
opportunity for public expression of social and economic needs. Second, public discourse
ensures that government is held accountable for equitable distribution of public resources.

Id. at 40.
See, e.g., Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, Sr. Lecturer, Sch. Comm., Univ. of Ghana, in Accra, Ghana (Mar.
13, 2013); PREMPEH, supra note 42, at 1.
52 See SEN, supra note 31, at 3.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 36.
55 Id. at 3.
50

51
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Public discussion is important to development because it shapes society’s
understanding of needs, deprivations, and feasible solutions.56 Because the topics
addressed by news media are both reflective and constitutive of social reality,
marginalization from public debate significantly increases the likelihood that a particular
group’s “unfreedoms” will be ignored.57 Participation in public debate, on the other hand,
provides a platform for “constructive impatience” by which individuals and communities
can demand official action on their behalf rather than being “passive recipients of the
benefits of cunning development programs.”58

Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 3, 11 (1999).
note 43, at 8.
58 SEN, supra note 31, at 11.
56

57 HASTY, supra

16

Robust political and civil liberties are also essential to development because of their

17

key role in preventing the “resource curse” from undermining both democratic progress

18

and economic growth.59 The resource curse refers to “a political/institutional and not an

59

PREMPEH, supra note 42, at 5.

19

economic phenomenon” in which newfound wealth causes democracy to malfunction in the

20

absence of meaningful checks and balances on executive power.60 In response to this
concern, Ghana’s Center for Democratic Development has advocated constitutional reforms
that “redress the persistent deficit of constitutionalism, of a lack of credible and robust
checks and balances, transparency and accountability in the working of government.”61 In

Ghana’s Oil Boom
In December 2010, Ghana began exporting oil and joined the ranks of Africa’s oil producers. Ghana’s sudden oil
boom sprouted fears of a “resource curse.” For example, Nigeria’s sudden production of oil has brought wealth to
very few while causing conflict and corruption in society. However, Ghana’s oil industry is regarded as one of the
better-regulated oil industries in Africa. The Oxford Business Group reported in February 2013 that “the country is
anxious to avoid the ‘resource curse’ that has affected other oil producers, and in recent years has invested
considerable time establishing an appropriate regulatory framework.” For example, the Petroleum Commission Act of
2011 in Ghana established an independent body to regulate the oil sector, and a committee monitors compliance with
industry law.
Companies with licenses in the nation’s offshore territory include both national and foreign companies, which
brings up fears of foreign encroachment. Therefore, one of the government’s key goals has been encouraging
domestic participation and boosting local content in the oil industry.
Sources:
1. Oxford Business Group, Ghana: Oil activity rising, Feb. 13, 2013, available at
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/ghana-oil-activity-rising.
2. BBC News, The curse of Nigerian oil, Jan. 3, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7808670.stm.

contrast to the concept of democracy, which focuses on elections, “constitutionalism is
concerned with regulating and disciplining the government’s exercise of its power . . . in the
period between elections”62 and particularly with regard to “the use and distribution of
public resources.”63 Meaningful oversight of official action is dependent upon free exercise
of civil and political liberties and is critical to ensuring that economic development is not
undermined by economic growth.

60

Id.
Id. at 6–7.
62 Id. at 2.
63 Id. at 5.

61
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Ghana has made incredible progress in the areas of democracy and civil and political
rights since 1992. The nation’s recent elections demonstrate the continuing vitality of
democratic rule and the Ghanaian media. Nevertheless, there are “certain patterns and
habits from the past,” including highly centralized power, significant unregulated
discretion for the executive, and “rampant use of political patronage,”—problems of
implementing constitutionalism—that have the potential to undermine Ghana’s economic
and political development if not addressed.64 Given the essential role of participatory
freedoms in increasing both the legitimacy and accountability of government, expanding
participatory freedoms is one way in which Ghana can strengthen and prepare its
flourishing democratic institutions to responsibly handle sudden oil wealth and other
unforeseen changes. As intrinsically valuable human rights and essential elements of
democracy and economic development, participatory freedoms must be a current priority
for Ghana rather than being relegated to a time of economic wealth that may never
materialize in their absence.

B. Free Speech and Press in Ghana’s Development
Ghana’s relatively recent past demonstrates the importance of media freedom for
both political and economic development. Ghana’s eighty years of colonial rule65 and thirtyfive years of post-independence non-democratic rule66 inform current proposals for reform
in the areas of freedom of information and effective regulation of the broadcast media.
Id. at 2.
Great Britain ruled Ghana as the Gold Coast Colony from 1876 to 1957. NAYLOR, supra note 2, at 15, 18.
66 From 1957 to Ghana’s first democratic elections in December of 1992, Ghana was governed by a series of
military regimes and largely unaccountable civilian governments. Id. at 19–30.
64

65
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Many Ghanaians remember the years when the average citizen had no voice, a time in
which there was neither the power of the ballot box nor the freedom to publicly express
one’s views. During this time, the media served as a guard dog for the government rather
than as a watchdog for the public. The government created and maintained this role for the
media by instituting barriers to open speech and free media: it carefully monitored the
press, interrogated and imprisoned journalists, and shut down private newspapers and
radio stations.67
Since freedom of speech and independence of the media were enshrined in Ghana’s
1992 Constitution, these traditional barriers to speech and media rights have been largely
removed. The press—both in traditional print and in newer forms—has flourished. The
media is no longer limited to state-owned sources that function as the mouthpiece of the
ruling political party. Instead, there are a variety of state-owned, community-based, and
private newspapers and radio stations operating in Ghana. Reporters and individuals are
largely free to openly express themselves. In fact, Ghana ranked third among African
countries in the 2013 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, with a world-wide
position in between the United Kingdom and United States.68 The Freedom House’s 2013
“Freedom in the World” rankings indicated that Ghana is a “free” country, characterized by
“open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent
civic life, and independent media.”69

For an account of one part of this period in Ghana’s history, see generally Yaw Twumasi, The Newspaper
Press and Political Leadership in Developing Nations: The Case of Ghana, 1964 to 1978, 26 INT’L COMM. GAZETTE 1
(1980).
68 REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX (2013), available at
http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf.
69 ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2013: DEMOCRATIC BREAKTHROUGHS IN THE BALANCE 4,
15 (2013), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet.pdf. To
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This Section describes Ghana’s move from repression of speech and state control of
the media to its contemporary embrace of free expression. This historical trajectory
explains the current state of affairs and sets the context for the potential reforms discussed
in later Sections of the Report. For although Ghana has fostered freedom of the media and
individual speech over the past two decades, further reforms are necessary to realize
complete and equal access to information and freedom of expression.
1. Speech and the Media Before Democracy

Charles McCarthy, the British Governor of the Gold Coast colony, founded Ghana’s
first newspaper, the Royal Gold Coast Gazette, in 1822.70 The paper, which catered to
European merchants and administrators living in the colony, “served as an official organ of
the British colonial administration.”71 Over a half century later, Ghanaians founded the first
locally owned and operated paper in Accra.72 Multiple Christian groups began printing
newspapers, some with columns in local languages, in the late nineteenth century.73 From
the late 1800s through Ghana’s independence, the well-educated Ghanaian elite and
Christian missionaries dominated the newspaper business.74 The British did not re-enter
the Ghanaian newspaper market until the British-owned Mirror Group bought out a locally

create the rankings, the Freedom House evaluated countries on a scale of one to seven for political rights and
civil liberties, with one as the best ranking and seven as the worst. Id. at 19. Ghana scored a one for political
rights and a two for civil liberties. Id. at 15. For context, only 22 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries
earned the Freedom House’s “free” ranking. Id. at 10.
70 KWAME KARIKARI, PRESS, POWER & POLITICS: GHANA 8 (2003).
71 Id. at 8; Kwadwo Anokwa, Press Performance Under Civilian and Military Regimes in Ghana: A Reassessment
of Past and Present Knowledge, in PRESS FREEDOM AND COMMUNICATION IN AFRICA 9 (Festus Eribo & William JongEbot eds. 1997).
72 Different sources cite different names for this initial publication. Compare KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 9
(using the title The West African Herald), with CLEMENT E. ASANTE, THE PRESS IN GHANA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
1 (1996) (calling the paper The Accra Herald).
73 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 9. Some of these papers still exist today. Id.
74 Id. at 10.
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owned paper in 1950.75 Their Daily Graphic quickly began to threaten smaller, regional
papers due to its superior funding and modern facilities.76
Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the press had a “political
and partisan character” as the local media attacked the colonial administration and its
policies.77 The colonial government maintained press-restrictive laws, from newspaper
registration ordinances to harsh criminal laws prohibiting seditious conduct by the press.78
It often censored or suppressed the Ghanaian-owned newspapers, such as the Ashanti
Pioneer, especially as the independence movement gained momentum in the 1950s.79 In
addition to censorship of print media, the colonial administration established Ghana’s first
radio station in 1935 with the purpose of serving the political and administrative goals of
the British Empire.80 Because the media was initially founded as a state organ and then
used for political purposes, this dual tradition—state ownership and media politicization—
has continued for much of Ghanaian history.
Ghana gained independence from Great Britain in 1957; it was the first Sub-Saharan
African country to do so.81 Its first leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was a former reporter who
understood the power of the media.82 To Nkrumah, the media had a duty to support the
government,83 because Ghana’s “independence was too important to be subjected to

75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.

at 10–11.

78 ASANTE, supra

note 72, at 3–4; Anokwa, supra note 71, at 9.
note 70, at 9.
80 Amin Alhassan, Market Valorization in Broadcasting Policy in Ghana: Abandoning the Quest for Media
Democratization, 27 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC. 211, 211–12 (2005).
81 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 7.
82 ASANTE, supra note 72, at 5–7 (“Nkrumah’s penchant for journalism and his desire to use the printed word
to gain political leverage and recognition started long before his return to Ghana in 1947.”)
83 Id.
79 KARIKARI, supra
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Western-style investigative reporting.”84 By 1962, Nkrumah had censored many
independent newspapers.85 Laws such as the Preventative Detention Act allowed his
government to detain newspaper editors (along with many others) without trial or charges
and the Minister of Information was able to stop publications that conflicted with the
government’s interests.86 When the government bought out the Daily Graphic and closed
other papers, the de facto state monopoly on the media became official.87
This state of media affairs continued through a number of military regimes and
failed attempts at democracy between the coup d’état that ended the Nkrumah regime in
1966 and the beginning of a true republican democracy in 1993.88 Between 1966 and 1981,
Ghana alternated between military regimes and short-lived civilian governments.89 As the
National Reconciliation Commission noted in 2004, the “history of media repression, cooptation and resistance . . . [that] crystallized during [Nkrumah’s regime] . . . became an
established pattern by successive regimes throughout the country’s history.”90 As a new
regime shifted into power, it replaced newspaper editors.91 Often newspapers would selfcensor under the watchful eye of military regimes, without much direct interference from
the government.92 For example, the media generally supported each new coup d’état as if

84 Id.
85 KARIKARI, supra

note 70, at 9.
at 9–11
87 Id. at 11. The government also controlled the only radio station, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation,
during this period. Alhassan, supra note 80, at 213–14.
88 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 11–12; Anokwa, supra note 71, at 5 (quoting General Ankrah, head of Ghana’s
first military government, when speaking about state control of the media: “He who pays the piper calls the
tune.”).
89 Anokwa, supra note 71, at 6
90 GHANA NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION REPORT 135 (2004).
91 Id. at 138.
92 Id.
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there were a choice.93 Even regimes that declared intentions of preserving a private press
soon reneged on their promises.94
Ghana’s 1979 Constitution purported to protect freedom of speech in various ways—
proclaiming the right to free speech, prohibiting media licensing laws, ending press
censorship, and establishing an independent press commission.95 These guarantees
remained unrealized during the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) rule in the
1980s and early 1990s. Licensing laws were reinstated and the state-owned media lost any
semblance of independence from the government.96 The government controlled the stateowned papers’ editorial boards and required the papers to portray the government in a
positive light.97 More subtle means of controlling the press were also available, from
reducing official advertising support or newsprint availability to rewarding “good”
reporters with expensive gifts or lofty promotions.98 Given the restrictions of this period,
“self-censorship was the rule in the media”99 and a “culture of silence” developed.100
Meanwhile, the state-owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) held a monopoly on
television and radio.101
2. The Turning Point: Ghana’s 1992 Constitution

As Ghanaians began to oppose the PNDC regime and clamor for a greater voice in
government, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, the head of the PNDC government,
Id. at 139, 142, 157.
Id. at 163. Because there was only state-owned radio to begin with, similar clamp-downs did not occur in
the broadcast sector. Alhassan, supra note 80, at 215.
95 LAVERLE BERRY, GHANA: A COUNTRY STUDY 223 (1994).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 ASANTE, supra note 72, at 118–20.
99 BERRY, supra note 95, at 223.
100 GHANA NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 185.
101 Alhassan, supra note 80, at 215.
93

94

27

concluded that “transition to democracy was the only long-term option.”102 On January 7,
1993, a new constitution ushered in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, the country’s fourth
attempted democratic government.103 This document, drafted in 1992 and thus referred to
as the 1992 Constitution, created a republican government consisting of a president,
parliament, cabinet, Council of State, and an independent judiciary, each with divided
powers to provide checks on the other departments.104 Chapter Five guarantees a host of
fundamental human rights, including freedom of speech.105 Article 21(1) provides that
“[a]ll persons shall have the right to (a) freedom of speech and expression, which shall
include freedom of the press and other media. . . . [and] (e) information, subject to such
qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society.”106 Exceptions are allowed
when they are “reasonably required for the purpose of safeguarding the people of Ghana
against the teaching or propagation of a doctrine which exhibits or encourages disrespect
for the nationhood of Ghana, the national symbols and emblems, or incites hatred against
other members of the community.”107
The freedom and independence of the media is reaffirmed later in Article 162 of the
Constitution.108 The government is not allowed to interfere with the editors and publishers
of newspapers by creating “impediments to the establishment of private press or media.”109
Additionally, media outlets are required to publish rejoinders made by those who disagree
with the media’s views and state-owned media must “afford fair opportunities and facilities
102 NAYLOR, supra
103 BERRY, supra

note 2, at 29.
note 95, at 217.

104 Id.
105 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA

1992, art. 21.

106 Id.

art. 21(4)(e).
art. 162(1) (“Freedom and independence of the media are hereby guaranteed.”).
109 Id. art. 162.

107 Id.

108 Id.
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for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions.”110 Again, exceptions can
be made when “reasonably required in the interest of national security, public order, public
morality and for the purpose of protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of other
persons.”111
The 1992 Constitution also provided for a National Media Commission (NMC),
which was established by legislative enactment in 1993.112 The NMC is an eighteenmember body with representatives appointed by the President, Parliament, industry
groups such as the GJA and the Ghana Bar Association, and religious groups.113 Its goals are
to ensure “the freedom and independence of the media,” to establish “the highest
journalistic standards in the mass media,” to “insulate the state-owned media from
governmental control,” and to create publication registration regulations.114
3. Post-Constitutional Legal & Practical Developments

In the two decades after the 1992 Constitution, democracy flourished in Ghana. In
fact, as early as 1994, the reforms of the 1992 Constitution were taking effect: “the press
ha[d] begun to enjoy a significant degree of toleration and freedom of expression.”115
Despite resource obstacles, hundreds of media outlets in Ghana began to operate. In the
first ten years of the Fourth Republic, Ghanaians founded over two hundred newspapers
and magazines—many short-lived. Of the hundreds of publications, approximately three

art. 162(6), 163.
art. 164.
112 BERRY, supra note 95, at 224.
113 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 166. Five seats on the Commission are political
appointments (two by the president and three by parliament); the others are selected by civil-society groups
such as those listed above. Id.
114 Id. art. 167.
115 BERRY, supra note 95, at 224.
110 Id.

111 Id.
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dozen became stable newspapers.116 Although the state still owns some newspapers, these
newspapers have editorial discretion—they are state-owned, rather than statecontrolled.117 Commercial radio stations, such as JOY FM, and community radio stations,
such as Radio Ada, have also become mainstays of the Ghanaian media.118 Furthermore, the
media has played the role that development scholars urged; one scholar has noted that “the
media has been instrumental in safeguarding the country’s democratic principles by
performing its watchdog and monitoring functions.”119 This has enabled Ghanaians “to
participate more fully in public life.”120
The Supreme Court played a key role in this transition by ensuring that several of
the mandates of the 1992 Constitution came to fruition. On July 22, 1993, the Supreme
Court announced three decisions in favor of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), a newly formed
opposition party, including one decision in a media rights case.121 These cases collectively
symbolized the independence of the judiciary from the executive;122 substantively, they
involved important aspects of media freedom. In New Patriotic Party v. Ghana Broadcasting
Corp.,123 the NPP challenged the coverage of the 1993 budget by the Ghana Broadcasting
Corporation (GBC). After the Minister of Finance, Kwesi Botchwey, defended the budget for
over two hours on radio and television, the NPP applied to the GBC to be given equal time

116 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 13. The papers support themselves through circulation sales and advertising;
though advertising can be difficult. Id. at 18. Some of the independent papers receive funding from
international organizations. Id. at 14.
117 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29.
118 See generally, e.g., Seyram Avle, Global Flows, Media and Developing Democracies: The Ghanaian Case, 3 J.
AFRICAN MEDIA STUDIES 7 (2011).
119 Arthur, supra note 3, at 209.
120 AUDREY GADZEKPO, GHANA CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC DEV., CONST. REV. SERIES NO. 6, REFORMING THE CONSTITUTION OF
GHANA FOR A NEW ERA: AVERTING THE PERIL OF A CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM 9 (2011).
121 BERRY, supra note 95, at 231.
122 Id.
123 [1993-94] 2 GLR 354–93.
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to voice its opinion on the budget.124 When the GBC refused the request, the NPP sued,
citing articles 55(11) and 163 of the 1992 Constitution, which guarantee equal coverage for
opposition political parties.125 The Supreme Court decided that the state-owned GBC was
required to give the NPP “fair and equal access to its facilities within two weeks.”126 This
meant that equal access had to be given to each political party by the state-owned media so
that they could present their social, political, and economic platforms.127 The Court justified
its decision in terms of Ghana’s budding democracy:
The free exchange of views is necessary to give the electorate
an opportunity to assess the performance of the government in
power against the potential of an opposition in the wilderness.
It keeps the government on its toes and gives the neutral,
apolitical citizen an opportunity to make up his mind. . . . In a
truly democratic environment, this testing ground is sine qua
non to the survival of a free pluralistic society.128
The Supreme Court also played a key role in allocating power between the government and
the NMC, which had come into early conflict with the ruling government—an unsurprising
development given Ghana’s long history of state control of the media.129 The Court upheld
the NMC’s right to appoint the chief editors of the state-owned media.130 However, in a
separate case, the Court maintained executive control over the distribution of radio

124 ERNEST KOFI ABOTSI,

STUDY ON STATE OF MEDIA RIGHTS AND PRESS FREEDOM IN GHANA 10.
Id.
126 BERRY, supra note 95, at 232.
127 ABOTSI, supra note 124, at 11.
128 MAXWELL OPOKU-AGYEMANG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HISTORY OF GHANA 374–75 (2009) (quoting New
Patriotic Party v. Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (1993)).
129 See KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 21.
130 Id. at 21–22; see also CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 169 (“Editors of the state-owned
media shall be appointed by the governing bodies of the respective corporations in consultation with the
Public Services Commission.”); art. 172 (“Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution or by any other
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frequencies to broadcasters.131 After the government shut down an independent station in
1994, the station’s owner sued, citing article 162(3) of the 1992 Constitution which
prohibits licensing laws.132 At the time, the Radio Frequency Control Board (RFCB),133
controlled by the executive, allocated frequencies.134 In Republic v. Independent Media
Corporation of Ghana,135 the Supreme Court held that the regulation of radio frequencies
was permissible under the 1992 Constitution’s exceptions to safeguard national security
and public order.136
Even after the Court ironed out these constitutional difficulties, the media still faced
legal constraints, as many pre-1992 laws remained on the books. For example, between
1993 and 1996, there were sixty-eight court cases brought against journalists; by 1999,
120 court cases had been filed against the private press, most of them initiated by the
government and the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) party.137 Often, these
cases led to hefty monetary damages or even jail time;138 the simple threat of such lawsuits
created an atmosphere that stifled journalistic freedom, despite the theoretical
constitutional guarantees. In both print and radio, self-censorship remained the norm
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during much of the 1990s, partially out of subtle government pressure and partially out of
habit.139
Tensions increased as the 2000 elections drew near. That year, police arrested a
publisher and editor of the Ghanaian Chronicle and an editor of The Independent.140 A 1999
Freedom House report on global press freedom listed Ghana’s press as being “not free”
because the ruling government arrested journalists, shut down opposition radio stations
during election season, and initiated criminal libel suits against reporters who spoke out.141
In the most famous such case, Republic v. Tommy Thompson Books Ltd and Others,142 the
Supreme Court upheld the criminal libel law as constitutional, citing the fact that article
164 subjects the freedom of the press to reasonable limitations.143 The newly-elected NPP
government finally repealed criminal punishments for defamation in 2001.144 This
development has been “celebrated as being pivotal in the harmonization of pre-1993
received laws and the Constitution.”145 The consequences of the repeal were so important
that Professor Ernest Kofi Abotsi has declared that it “prompted an explosion in the media
landscape,” especially for radio.146 The end of criminal-libel liability provided significant
relief for journalists, though other legal barriers remain: reporters are still subject to civil

at 26 (noting that a private radio owner described “a regime of self-censorship in operation” at private
radio stations in 1999 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 Id. at 4.
141 Id. Note that the earliest Freedom House Press Freedom Report on Ghana available online is from 2002. In
2002, following the first peaceful power transition in the Fourth Republic and the repeal of the criminal libel
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http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2002/ghana (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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libel lawsuits, judicially imposed contempt of court,147 and criminal punishment for
incitement of public fear.148
4. Second Generation Rights

Both democracy and constitutionalism in Ghana have come a long way since the
nation’s 1957 independence. Indeed, the media has achieved almost full independence
from government control. To date, Ghana has held five successful elections—in 1992, 1996,
2000, 2008, and 2012—and witnessed peaceful transfers of political power in 2000 and
2008.149 The media has played an instrumental role in the country’s democratic elections
and transitions.150 Even so, Ghana is still striving to make further improvements to its
constitutional system. For example, from 2010 to 2011, a Constitutional Review
Commission closely examined the 1992 Constitution and recommended amendments to
better implement the Constitution’s overarching goals.151 The Constitutional Review
Commission’s report on the media recognized that “these are indeed the best of times for
the media,” but that “there are a number of challenges that militate against the lofty goals
the Constitution seeks to achieve.”152
Now that the media’s basic independence and efficacy have been established, a
second generation of reforms may begin to take shape. “Second generation” reforms will
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allow Ghana to more fully realize the virtues of free speech as a human right and a tool of
development. Going beyond formal independence of the press, second generation reforms
must focus on continuing areas of concern: resource allocation, training and professional
development of journalists, access to government information, and a regulatory scheme
that ensures media’s substantive independence while also ensuring accountability. Ghana
is well on its way to implementing these kind of second-generation reforms. To promote a
more robust public sphere, one that respects the rights of citizens to both receive and share
information—to hear and to be heard—two pieces of legislation have been introduced: the
Right to Information Bill and the Broadcasting Bill. These proposed legal reforms attempt
to translate free-speech values into public policy and are thus important vehicles for
achieving the twin aims of democratic participation and economic development.
Sections IV and V of this Report analyze these legislative proposals for accessing and
sharing information in turn. Each Section begins by exploring the theoretical
underpinnings of the two proposals, discussing why they matter and how such reforms fit
into broader international trends regarding the regulation of speech and information. Each
Section then considers the obstacles Ghana faces to fully implementing such legislation, and
finally, each Section concludes by offering some suggested solutions to the problems
identified.
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IV. Access to Information

A. The Importance of the Right to Access Information
Absent the ability to access details about the government and its dealings—how it
spends its money, how it enforces its laws, or how it regulates its economy—political, legal,
and economic life would be shrouded in mystery. In such an information-less world,
citizens searching for answers about their government would confront nothing but silence;
journalists, nothing but evasive answers or closed doors. Corruption, bribery, and abuse
would run free, unimpeded by the people who—without information—would have no
power to check the powerful themselves.
Perhaps American Founding Father James Madison had this nightmarish scenario in
mind when he famously remarked, “[a] popular government, without popular information
or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own
governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”153 Speaking some
170 years later, it was the thought of a world without a right to information that led thenU.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan (himself a Ghanaian) to characterize information access
as both “central to democracy”154 and a “condition[] for [economic] development.”155
International law surrounding the right to information has developed with these
considerations in mind. In 1946, the first session of the United Nations General Assembly
passed a resolution voicing support for a right to information, declaring, “[f]reedom of
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard
Hunt ed. 1910).
154 Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General, Address to the World Bank Global Knowledge 1997 Conference (June
23, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19970623.sgsm6268.html.
155 Id.
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information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to
which the United Nations is consecrated.”156 Two years later, the General Assembly
enshrined the right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas” in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.157 Emphasizing its importance, the Special Rapporteur
subsequently clarified this provision in an annual report to the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights:
[T]he right to seek and receive information is not simply a converse of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression but a freedom on its own. . . .
[T]he right to seek, receive and impart information imposes a positive
obligation on States to ensure access to information, particularly with regard
to information held by the Government . . . .”158
This approach to information access has rapidly expanded into other international
legal contexts. In fact, since its enumeration in the Declaration of Human Rights, the right to
information has grown seemingly ubiquitous, especially of late. It has been codified in
many international legal documents, including the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption,159 the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,160 and the Aarhus
Covenant.161 Regional international bodies have also protected the right to information,

U.N. G.A. Res. 59(I), at 95, U.N. Doc. A/229 (Dec. 14, 1946), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/10/IMG/NR003310.pdf?OpenElement.
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protections that can be found in the legal provisions of such diverse associations as the
Council of Europe, the European Union, the African Union, the Southern African
Development Community, the Organization of American States, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States.162 Indeed, the right to information has become so
popular that at least eighty-six countries have passed some form of freedom of information
legislation, with another thirty-five countries contemplating pending statutes.163
Ghana numbers among those thirty-five. Since 2003, Ghana has considered passing
a Right to Information Bill that would operationalize the guarantee provided in its
Constitution protecting the right to access information.164 Despite having a constitutional
provision on point, statutory reform is necessary to turn this abstract information right
into a concrete reality for everyday Ghanaians. This task raises challenging questions about
the relationship between the individual and the state, the virtues and the limits of
transparency, and the framework needed to successfully implement what international law
regards as a fundamental human right. To address these questions, this Section considers
why a right to information matters in the first place. It then turns to how that right might
be put into practice by drawing on the experiences of other countries that have
implemented freedom of information legislation.

162 A detailed discussion of these regional international bodies and their many treaties is beyond the scope of
this paper. For a more complete discussion, see David Banisar, Freedom of Information Around the World
2006: A Global Survey of Access to Government Information Laws, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (2006), available
athttp://www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2006.pdf.
163 Roger Vleugels, Overview of all FOIA Countries, STATEWATCH (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/sep/foi-overview-86-countries-sep-2008.pdf.
164 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art.21(f) (“All persons shall have the right to information,
subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society.”).
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1. Why Does The Right To Information Matter?

Legal scholars have long contemplated why a right to information is important, both
as a matter of constitutional and statutory law. Drawing from these rationales, this Section
offers a framework for conceptualizing the reasons for a right to information.165 Some of
these rationales relate to democratic development; they explain the value of the
information right in the context of broad notions about politics, legitimacy, and human
dignity. Others relate to economic development; they provide on-the-ground justifications
for how robust legal protections surrounding information access can reduce corruption,
preserve private property rights, and improve public health.166
a. Democratic Development

Access to information allows the public to participate in the democratic decisionmaking process. While such informed participation can facilitate better public policy that is
more in tune with the needs of the people, it is also an end in and of itself; “democracy,
after all, is not about the people necessarily being right, but about the right of the people to
be wrong.”167 For citizens to exercise the right afforded to them under a democratic system
to control their government, “[c]itizens [must] be fully informed and able to participate as

This framework and the rationales it contains are adapted from the insights of several free speech and
administrative law scholars who have considered the value of information access. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin,
“The First Amendment is an Information Policy,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2213465 (Feb. 7, 2013); Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV.
1339 (2011); Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Information, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
357 (2011); John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of
Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85 (2006).
166 Such categorizations should not be taken for more than they are worth. To be sure, democratic
development and economic development are mutually reinforcing processes, and factors influencing one may
very well influence the other. The aim here is simply to develop an analytical framework for thinking about
why a right to information matters. To that end, the distinction between democratic and economic
development is helpful, but that is not to suggest that those aims are somehow mutually exclusive—they are
decidedly not.
167 Schauer, supra note 165, at 1349.
165
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democratic citizens,”168 a condition that is only possible “if they are able to access
information held about them and on their behalf by the government.”169 In this way, a right
to information is an “initial condition”170 for citizen participation in the democratic process.
Fundamental procedural political rights such as freedom of expression and the right to vote
are rendered meaningless if the people remain ignorant of the internal workings of their
government.171
Because access to information is a precondition for the exercise of other rights
fundamental to the democratic process, it has the potential to strengthen relationships
between individuals and between the individual and the state. More information
encourages vibrant political debate among citizens, thereby increasing levels of social
capital and facilitating social functioning. Possession of information access also suggests a
duty, as a condition of citizenship, of the people to actively monitor the conduct of their
government and to participate in politics.172 A right to information thus lays the
groundwork for a civic revival, one where participation in politics is not just a right but also
a responsibility.
In this way, more information in the hands of the public allows citizens to actively
hold their government accountable. Knowledge is power, and freedom of information laws
put authority back in the hands of the people. Because governments know that citizens can
monitor their operations, freedom of information laws deter bad behavior in the form of

Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 165, at 92.
Id.
170 Peled & Rabin, supra note 165, at 360.
171 Id. at 361 (“The ability of individuals, interest groups, and organizations to actively participate in political
debates deciding issues on the public agenda, as well as the very possibility of placing issues on that agenda,
is tightly linked to their ability to obtain relevant information.”).
172 Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 165, at 90.
168

169

40

secrecy, corruption, bribery, and regulatory capture.173 For example, freedom of
information statutes have played an instrumental role in revealing information about past
human rights abuses, political scandals, and presidential secrecy.174 It should come as little
surprise, then, that of the twenty least corrupt countries in the world,175 eighteen have
implemented statutory rights to information.
Table 1: 20 Least Corrupt Countries and Freedom of Information Laws
Country
1. New Zealand
2. Denmark
3. Finland
4. Sweden
5. Singapore
6. Norway
7. Netherlands
8. Australia
9. Switzerland
10. Canada

Freedom of information
law?
Yes
(1982)
Yes
(1970)
Yes
(1951)
Yes
(1766)
No
(--)
Yes
(1970)
Yes
(1978)
Yes
(1982)
Yes
(2004)
Yes
(1982)

Country
11. Luxembourg
12. Hong Kong
13. Iceland
14. Germany
15. Japan
16. Austria
17. Barbados
18. United Kingdom
19. Belgium
20. Ireland

Freedom of information
law?
Yes
(1978)
Yes
(1995)
Yes
(1969)
Yes
(2005)
Yes
(1999)
Yes
(1987)
No
(--)
Yes
(2000)
Yes
(1994)
Yes
(1997)

The ability of citizens to engage in administrative oversight that accompanies the
passage of freedom of information statutes encourages public officials to make their
Schauer, supra note 165, at 1349; see also LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKER’S USE
IT 92 (1913) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial disease. Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants . . . .”).
174 ARTICLE 19: GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TRAINING MANUAL FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS 13–15 (2006), available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/tools/foitrainersmanual.pdf.
175 For a complete set of data on worldwide levels of corruption, see 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM,
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-2.
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decision-making processes more transparent. Citizen access and input into government
policymaking can start an ongoing conversation between the government and the
governed, one that in the long run allows politicians and civil servants to better respond to
the needs of the people. Increased transparency on the part of government and increased
participation in government can improve the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the
people, even when the government makes policy choices with which some individuals
disagree. As such, a right to information can spark beneficial exchanges between the
government and its citizens and can have concrete, practical effects on political stability by
ensuring mutual respect and understanding between those with the information and those
requesting it.176
Additionally, freedom of information can facilitate the search for truth. Access to
information “inclines toward knowledge . . . even if it does not guarantee it.”177 More
information is preferable to less information because it leaves decisions about what is true
and what is false in the hands of the people, decisions to be made on their own terms and
free from government interference.178 Individuals must serve as the ultimate arbiters of
truth, not the government “which will always attempt to impose an orthodoxy consonant
with the frequently corrupt interests of the bureaucracy.”179 As such, a right to information
preserves autonomy and free choice—central features of any democratic regime—by
allowing individuals to make informed decisions for themselves, decisions that, without

Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 165, at 92.
Schauer, supra note 165, at 1350.
178 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
179 Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991).
176
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access to information, can never truly be free.180 A right to information thus demonstrates
deep respect for human dignity by enabling free thought and by preserving the right of an
individual to choose her own way, to find her own truth.
b. Economic Development
i. Decreased corruption. Reductions in corruption that flow from increased access to

information can fuel economic development by attracting foreign direct investment,
encouraging entrepreneurship, incentivizing innovation, and promoting fair
competition.181 As such, free information can complement the free market by reducing
transaction costs and fostering a more reliable, stable investment climate.182
The relationship between economic development and freedom from corruption is
especially stark in Sub-Saharan African countries. As Figure 1 demonstrates, there exists a
strong, positive correlation between increases in freedom from corruption and increases in
per capita gross domestic product. This relationship holds when analyzed globally as
well.183 Ghana’s freedom from corruption score is a full ten points higher than the mean
freedom from corruption score in Sub-Saharan Africa,184 but progress can still be made. For
example, Ghana’s freedom from corruption score is slightly below the worldwide
average,185 and Ghana ranks as the world’s seventy-first least corrupt country.186 A right to

Schauer, supra note 165, at 1350 (describing a right to information as “a necessary pathway on the road to
truth”).
181 Edwin J. Feulner, The Rule of Law, 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (2013),
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-2 (demonstrating the link between economic growth and low
levels of corruption).
182 Daniel Kaufmann & Tara Vishwanath, Toward Transparency: New Approaches and Their Applications to
Financial Markets, 16 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 41, 41–57 (2001) (highlighting the relationship between
economic development and access to information).
183 Feulner, supra note 181.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
180
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information bill could help change this dynamic by increasing public oversight of
government, reducing corruption, and, ultimately, increasing economic growth.
Studies have demonstrated, for example, that freedom of information statutes can
help corporations better assess the potential location of factories or headquarters, make
bids for government contracts, and adapt to future legal and regulatory changes, all
conditions that have the potential to spur both foreign direct investment and grassroots
entrepreneurial growth.187 On the other hand, a lack of transparency can impede economic
growth by creating conditions that permit poor government accounting procedures and
that allow private officials to pocket money that would otherwise be used to fund public
projects, such as infrastructure improvements, public health initiatives, or construction of
new schools. Angola’s lack of freedom of information legislation, for example, played a role
in permitting five years’ worth of oil revenue—$8.45 billion—to disappear into private
hands.188
ii. Property rights. A right to information can also serve important property interests.

Ownership and control of information is vested in the state acting for the public as a whole.
But information held by public authorities is ultimately the property of a state’s citizens;
after all, it was created and compiled by civil servants “considered to be public trustees
who carry out their mandate by means of taxes paid [by] the public.”189 Thus, the owners of
the information—those who financed its creation—have a proprietary stake in their ability
to access that information, which was produced to serve a public purpose. A right to
187 WORLD BANK INITIATIVE, COMPANIES AND THE RIGHT TO ACCESS PUBLIC INFORMATION

5 (Apr. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.accessinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Companies%20and%20the%20Right%20to%20Access
%20Public%20Information.pdf.
188 COLIN DARCH & PETER G. UNDERWOOD, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 222 (2010).
189 Peled & Rabin, supra note 165, at 365.
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information safeguards these property interests by ensuring that government officials, in
their capacity as public trustees, do not step outside the terms that determine the
trusteeship by artificially restricting access to information that is not theirs in the first
place.190
Access to information also safeguards important interests in real property. A title
registration system that provides a reliable record of land rights increases protection for
landowners from arbitrary government takings and facilitates conveyances and other
transactions.191 Transparent documentation of ownership rights in a system accessible to
the average landowner is an especially pressing problem for West African countries where
only two to three percent of land is held by written title,192 despite the fact that West
African economies rely heavily on agricultural and natural resource production.193 While
such a system must be carefully tailored to align with traditional customary institutions
that have long regulated property rights,194 access to information about land ownership
through a reliable and transparent title registration system could go a long way toward
strengthening property rights for average citizens.

190 Id. at 366 (“The proprietary justification treats damage to the individual’s right to information as if it were,
in effect, damage to the individual citizen’s property rights.”).
191 See, e.g., Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 183 (1995).
192 Camila Toulmin, Securing Land and Property Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Local Institutions,
INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV. 27, 34 (2006), available at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G00460.pdf.
193 Id. at 29.
194 Id. at 28–29. See also Joseph Blocher, Note, Building on Custom: Land Tenure Policy and Economic
Development in Ghana, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 166 (2006).

45

Property, Information, and the Salt Flats
Since “time immemorial,” the Songor lagoon and salt flats have been an important source of livelihood for people in
the Ada communities.1 Traditionally, salt was treated as a communal resource both in and beyond the Ada
communities; salt collectors “travelled from far and wide to the Songor without being turned away.”2 Beginning with
colonization and continuing into contemporary times, however, the Ada community has struggled to defend communal
access to the salt flats from both government appropriation and commercialization.3
Radio Ada has served a critical role in mobilizing the community to collectively defend their access to this
important natural resource. In addition to disseminating information to the community about attempts to privatize the
salt flats, participatory radio programs have created a platform for pluralistic and intergenerational discussion that has
ensured that local leaders are responsive to the community’s needs.4 “[R]ooted in the ongoing collective defense of
community-felt needs,” Radio Ada is an excellent example of the role that community radio can play in allowing
marginalized groups to “challenge not only the material reality but also the epistemic logic of neoliberal globalized
resource alienation” and other development projects that are inconsistent with local needs and values.5
1

Ato Kobbie, Salt: Ada Wants Community-Friendly Law… as They Reject Alternative Livelihood, BUSINESS ANALYST, Dec. 3 2012,
available at http://www.ghanabusinessanalyst.com/index.php/trade-industry/item/208-salt-ada-wants-community-friendly-law-asthey-reject-alternative-livelihood.
2
Jonathan Langdon, Contesting Globalization in Ghana: Communal Resource Defense and Social Movement Learning, 2 J. ALT.
PERSP. SOC. SCI. 309, 319 (2010).
3
Id. at 318.
4
Id. at 331–33.
4

iii. Public health. Increased access to information can improve the health of citizens by

improving public awareness about the nature and the risks of communicable diseases. For
example, some scholars have attributed the rapid spread of HIV in Africa and the severity
of the SARS outbreak in China to the failure of governments to provide the public with
timely information about such diseases, their causes, their consequences, and their
treatment.195 Economist Amartya Sen has argued that media access to information is
central to preventing famines because the media has the ability to hold politicians
accountable by raising awareness about an emerging food crisis.196 This theory holds
particular salience in light of India’s experience with its Right to Information Act, which
was recently used to expose government officials who stole over four million kilograms of
195 DARCH & UNDERWOOD,
196 SEN, supra

supra note 188, at 23.
note 31, at 51–52.
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rice intended for distribution to the poor.197 And freedom of information statutes can
improve public health by increasing public access to environmental data, including sources
of pollution and environmental impact statements.198
2. Limits on the Right to Information

This does not mean that the right to information has no limits. Right to information
statutes around the world contain exemptions to protect individual privacy, national
security, and trade secrets, among others.199 That said, access to information serves
important aims, and right to information legislation must be carefully drafted so as not to
impose limits that contravene the pragmatic and theoretical rationales outlined above. To
better illuminate the nature of these challenges, this Section provides a comparative
analysis of right to information statutes.
3. Who Should Give What To Whom? Central Features of Right to Information Statutes

While Ghana has a constitutional provision ensuring a right to information, such a
provision can be difficult to translate into practice without appropriate enforcement
legislation. Crafting such legislation requires those involved to answer the fundamental
question confronting any freedom of information law: who should give what to whom?
In evaluating the efficacy of the current Freedom of Information Bill before
Parliament, it may be helpful for legal scholars, politicians, journalists, and everyday
citizens alike to have a sense of the common features freedom of information statutes share
and the way they have been implemented in other countries across the globe.

Alasdair Roberts, India’s Right to Information Act: The First Four Years, FREEDOMINFO (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.freedominfo.org/2010/01/indias-right-to-information-act-the-first-four-years/.
198 DARCH & UNDERWOOD, supra note 188, at 24.
199 See generally Banisar, supra note 162.
197
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Scholars have outlined nine central features shared by the majority of freedom of
information statutes. These are listed in Table 2. A comparative analysis of freedom of
information regimes can be found in Appendix III.
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Table 2. Features of Free Information Regimes200
Principle
1. Maximum disclosure

2. Obligation to publish

3. Promotion of open
government

4. Limited scope of
exceptions

5. Processes to facilitate
access

6. Costs

7. Open meetings
8. Disclosure takes
precedence
9. Protection for
whistleblowers

Description
a. Freedom of information laws presume access
b. The mandate to provide information extends to all elected
bodies as well as private bodies that carry out public functions
c. Information includes records regardless of the form in which
they are stored
a. Public bodies should disseminate key information even in the
absence of a request
b. New technologies makes it easier to disseminate more
information at less cost
c. Routine disclosure will minimize the need for individuals to
request access
a. Public culture must recognize the need for information as a
fundamental human right
b. Steps must be taken to inform citizens about the right to
information, why it matters, and how it can be invoked
c. Those who willfully obstruct access to information should face
legal repercussions
a. Limits on access to information should be carefully
circumscribed
b. Exceptions should protect overriding public and private
interests, including privacy
c. Exceptions should apply only where there is risk of substantial
harm to the potential interest and that harm is greater than the
public interest in having the information
a. Requests for information should be processed rapidly
b. Reasons should be articulated for a denial of access to
information
c. Independent review of a denial should be available
a. Fees should not deter citizens from making requests
b. Fees should not exceed the costs incurred to produce the
information
c. The public should be on notice of such fees and they should be
levied fairly and consistently across requests
a. Meetings of public bodies should be open to the public to the
fullest extent possible
a. Laws inconsistent with the presumption of disclosure should be
repealed or overridden by freedom of information statutes
a. Individuals who release information on government
wrongdoing should be protected from retaliatory action

Information compiled from TONY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 31–40 (2d
ed. 2008);ARTICLE 19: GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 174.
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B. Obstacles to Accessing Information
Ghana’s robust constitutional media protections have resulted in a proliferation of
print and broadcast media that undoubtedly help achieve the information-related values
discussed above. However, while Ghana has a constitutional provision ensuring a right to
information for its citizens,201 legislation is necessary to realize this right. Access to
information is clearly important to Ghanaians, but there are substantial obstacles standing
in the way of a right to information in Ghana. Some of these obstacles can be addressed
through statutory reform guaranteeing public access to government information, such as
the Right to Information Bill that Ghana’s Parliament is considering, while others are extralegal constraints that legislation may be unable to address. This Section seeks to identify
the most salient barriers to access to information in Ghana. The obstacles identified include
refusals to share information, lack of recordkeeping requirements, a disparity between
state-owned and private media, inequalities across the country, and professionalism
concerns.
1. Refusals to Share Information

The government’s unwillingness to share information is one of the most salient
barriers to access to information in Ghana. Although such refusals have decreased since the
ratification of the 1992 Constitution and the repeal of the criminal libel law, they still occur.
At this time, no right to information law exists to guarantee public access to government
information. Moreover, some government officials are required to keep information

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, Art. 21(1)(f) (“All persons shall have the right to information,
subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society.”)
201
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confidential, while many government agencies are reluctant to release information even
when it is unclassified.202
Access to government information is hampered by a lack of enforceable disclosure
requirements. For example, Bright Blewu of the Ghana Journalists Association notes that
Ghana was forced to pay a number of judgments on contracts that the public did not know
existed.203 Local agents had contracted on behalf of the state, kept their contracts secret,
and then defaulted. With a right to information law, the public would have had access to
information regarding those contracts.204 This lack of information from the government
provides an excuse for journalists to do less digging and hampers investigative
journalism.205 Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, General Manager of Newspapers at the Daily Graphic,
concludes that a right to information law is one mechanism for making public officials
responsive to the needs of the public.206
The media’s reluctance to obtain and share information—a remnant of the “culture
of silence”—is also problematic.207 Before ratification of the 1992 Constitution,
commentators noted that Ghana’s government fostered an environment in which
journalists engaged in self-censorship and refused to share information with the public for
fear of government reprisals, such as job loss and violence.208 While journalists are more
likely to publish stories that criticize the government now than they were in the past,
202 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Comm. of Parliament, in Accra, Ghana (Mar.
14, 2013).
203 Interview with Bright Blewu, supra note 26.
204 Id.
205 Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, supra note 51.
206 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29.
207 See Lusike Lynete Mukhongo, Can the Media in Africa Shape Africa’s Political Future?, 2 J. AFRICAN MEDIA
STUDIES 339, 345 (2010) (“In a majority of African countries today, the media not only sets the agenda of the
people and the nation as a whole but the media also influences public opinion with regard to elections,
constitution making and corruption.”).
209 Temin & Smith, supra note 25, at 588.
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journalists from the state-owned media continue to refuse to publish certain stories and
instead hand them over to journalists in the private media, who have more freedom to
publish critical material.209 To be sure, the state-owned media will cover events that
negatively portray the government, but they rarely go as in-depth as the private media
does.210 However, the private media are also not entirely free to publish what they wish
due to other laws on the books that prevent robust information sharing with the public,
such as civil libel laws and Section 208 of the Criminal Offenses Act.211
2. Record Keeping

A second major obstacle to access to information in Ghana is the failure to maintain
relevant records, even when the law requires it. The Ghana Public Records and Archives
Administration Act, 1997 (Act 535) “[i]mposes on public bodies the duty to maintain
records”212 and established a Public Records and Archives Administration Department
(PRAAD), but it is unclear to what extent this law is enforced.213 The Coalition on the Right
to Information reported, “Proper recordkeeping has been on the backburner of many
organisations.”214 A right to information law cannot be useful unless the holders of
information keep accurate records.
Resource constraints perpetuate poor record keeping. In July 2012, the Daily
Graphic reported that national records at PRAAD were deteriorating due to poor
HASTY, supra note 43, at 77; Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29.
See HASTY, supra note 43, at 73 (“As a witness to the actions of the state, the [state] journalist is expected to
faithfully record the events, asking questions only for clarification . . . . I never heard a state journalist pose a
critical question while on assignment.”); Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, supra note 51.
211 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202.
212 COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION - GHANA, CONCERNS ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION BILL 19 (last accessed
May 6, 2013), available at http://www.rticampaignghana.org/concerns/.
213 Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, supra note 51 (reporting that there may be a statute requiring
organizations to keep records, but implementation is another issue).
214 COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION - GHANA, CONCERNS ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION BILL 19 (last accessed
May 6, 2013), available at http://www.rticampaignghana.org/concerns/.
209

210
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facilities.215 Moreover, the department has no backup records in case of a fire or natural
disaster.216 PRAAD’s lack of financial resources for proper record keeping hinders the
media and the public from retrieving necessary information, especially outside of Accra.217
Ghana’s eventual goal is digitization of records, which would remove concerns regarding
poor record keeping facilities, but that requires investments of time and money.218
Furthermore, there is no uniformity in record-keeping practices across government
agencies. PRAAD is responsible for establishing national standards for record keeping, but
it is unclear whether agencies are complying with those standards. Statutory reform could
address these issues by reinforcing the Ghana Public Records and Archives Administration
Act and establishing uniform standards for record keeping.
3. Disparity Between State-Owned and Private Media

Jennifer Hasty argues, “State and private journalists articulate different forms of
professional rhetoric, deploy different tactics of newsgathering, negotiate different political
pressures, and enjoy different forms of compensation and reward for their work.”219
Disparities between the state-owned and private media influence journalists’ access to
information and how that information is disseminated to the public.
For example, information is more readily available to the state-owned media than
the private media because the state-owned media have greater financial resources and

215 Seth J. Bokpe, National Archives in Danger of Losing Official Documents, DAILY GRAPHIC, July 20, 2012,
available at http://www.modernghana.com/news/407182/1/
national-archives-in-danger-of-losing-official-doc.html.
216 Id.
217 See id. (“The department is starved of funds . . . leaving very little for operations in all the 10 regional
offices.”).
218 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202.
219 HASTY, supra note 43, at 28.
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more access to the government for information.220 Journalists for the state-owned media
are often invited to the government ministries, the courts, and embassies to report on state
events.221 In contrast, journalists for the private press are sometimes turned away from
assignments at state offices. Reporters and counsel for the privately-owned Daily Guide
stated that the private media cannot cover stories at Flagstaff House (Ghana’s presidential
palace) and generally do not have as many sources from the government as the stateowned media do.222 However, the private media are expected to cover the same events as
the state-owned media and must find a way to access information from the government
without a right to information law.223 The government justifies its denial of access to the
private press on the basis that the private media is unprofessional, does not report the
facts, and promotes defamatory rumors in order to sell more newspapers or attract more
listeners.224
These issues of comparative professionalism, resource disparity, and access to
information interact in complex ways. Some argue that the private media’s lack of access to
information from the government and lack of financial resources contribute to
sensationalism among the private media because they must be sensational to sell their
papers and make a profit.225 Reporters and counsel at the Daily Guide stated that private

Interview with Freddie Blay, Chairman, Daily Guide, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 12, 2013).
HASTY, supra note 43, at 72; see also Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29 (reporting that
journalists cannot refuse to go when they are invited to government events, although they can determine
what to write).
222 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 12, 2013).
223 Id. (reporting that state and private media “all do the same job; the private journalists must go beyond
what they are told”).
224 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 12, 2013).
225 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222. The Editor said, “We are selling a product
and package to get attention. We have a competitive industry.” For more on the public-private media divide,
see Audrey Gadzekpo, Is There a Place for the State Media in a Constitutional Democracy?, IEA, OCCASIONAL

220

221

54

media must sell a product to stay afloat because they do not have a great deal of advertising
revenue.226 Also, businesses are reluctant to place advertisements in the private press for
fear of upsetting the government, and the private media worry about isolating Ghanaian
companies through their news coverage.227 Despite financial difficulties, however,
reporters from the private media feel that they have more freedom to publish what they
wish and say that journalists often move from the state-owned media to the private
media“because they want more independence, though they face more financial
difficulties.”228
4. Inequalities Across the Country

Inequalities across the country, particularly between the urban and rural areas,
present another significant obstacle to the free flow of information. Disparities in literacy
rates, spoken languages, and resources hamper Ghanaians’ access to information from both
the government and the media, especially for rural areas of the country. As noted above, 77
percent of men and 63 percent of women in Ghana are literate,229 but literacy rates are
much lower in rural areas of Ghana.230 This disparity in literacy rates furthers an urbanrural divide, where Ghanaians in urban areas are more easily able to retrieve information.
Additionally, Ghanaians speak a variety of different languages and many do not speak
English, which is the primary language used in print media and government
PAPER NO. 17, at 15 (discussing how the private media relies on sensationalism to make a profit, while the
state media can “afford to play it safe by avoiding political scandal and what is regarded as sensationalism”).
226 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222; see also KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 18
(“Circulation is the key to survival [for private newspapers] as advertising has not shown marked growth.”).
227 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222.
228 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222. The Editor of the Daily Guide shared that
a state editor called him the day of our interview to provide a story that the state editor could not run. Id.
229 GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., supra note 12, at 12.
230 AfricaFocus Bulletin, African Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/afrfocus/afrfocus011309.html.
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communications.231 Ghanaians in urban centers are more likely to speak English,232 thus
furthering the urban-rural divide.
Ada, a town on the eastern coast of Ghana, provides a good illustration of how wide
the information-access gap is between Accra, where most media outlets are headquartered
and the population is largely literate, and rural towns, where many adults are illiterate and
only understand their local dialect. People in Ada rely on the radio to access information
because the major newspapers are printed in English.233 Although the proliferation of cell
phone and radio use has helped to decrease the information gap between urban and rural
areas, rural towns like Ada still have limited access to information through the print
media.234
In addition, disparities between the rich and poor perpetuate an elite-dominated
media that hampers the ability of poor Ghanaians to access and influence information. For
example, Seyram Avle discusses the “global cosmopolitans” or “Argonauts,” a small but
growing cultural elite in Ghanaian urban centers.235 This group consists of Ghanaians who
travel to the West to work and study and then return to Ghana to start-up companies,
which are often major media businesses.236 Avle argues that this “educated and fairly
wealthy group is defined by its education and access to information,” and that it now
231 Temin & Smith, supra note 25, at 597 (“Shortly before the 2000 elections, the English illiteracy rate was
estimated by the government to be 53 percent. Virtually all Ghanaian newspapers are printed only in
English.”).
232 See id. at 600 (“Along these lines is the finding that people in urban areas are much more inclined to read
newspapers than rural inhabitants, perhaps because they have greater access to them and tend to be
wealthier and better educated.”).
233 Id. at 597.
234 See KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 3 (“Both privately owned and state-run newspapers influence the political
debate, but their impact is limited by the low literacy rate, the high price of a single-copy newspaper—about
half or a third of the daily wage in a country where annual per capita income is about $1,800—and poor
circulation.”). As noted below, broadcast media helps close the gap.
235 Avle, supra note 118, at 15.
236 Id.
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determines what is heard by the nation.237 Thus, this new cultural elite has access to
information that average Ghanaians do not, and as a result, the elite participate in agendasetting and decision making that may enhance disparities in access to information by
choosing to report on news that is more relevant to their class.238 This trend is likely to
perpetuate the urban-rural divide.
5. Professionalism

Some journalists’ lack of professionalism presents an obstacle for public access to
information from the media. Audrey Gadzekpo laments, “Many journalists display a lack of
ethics, professionalism, and a weak commitment to democratic ethos.”239 The National
Media Commission (NMC) is charged with “[t]aking all appropriate measures to ensure the
establishment and maintenance of the highest journalistic standards, including the
investigation, mediation and settlement of complaints made against or by the press or
other mass media.”240 However, the NMC is unable to sanction journalists for professional
violations, which hampers its role in upholding high journalistic standards.241 Moreover,
the GJA, which includes journalists from both the state-owned and private media, has
created a uniform set of ethical standards, but these standards are not enforceable.242
In addition, many stakeholders feel that the lack of training required to practice
journalism is a hindrance to professionalism in the field. Despite the existence of training

Id. at 16.
See id. (“No longer is it the sole purview of the political elite (read government) to determine what is heard
by the nation. Instead, a young urban group of people may now have its voice heard, quite powerfully, over
the airwaves.”).
239 Gadzekpo, supra note 225, at 11.
240 GADZEKPO, supra note 120, at 6.
241 Interview with George Sarpong, Exec. Sec’y, Nat’l Media Comm’n, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 14, 2013).
242 Interview with Representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222. According to interviewees, the primary
means of enforcing these standards is through “name and shame.” Id.
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institutions such as the Ghana Institute of Journalism and the University of Ghana’s School
of Communication Studies, many Ghanaians feel they cannot trust journalists to report
accurately or objectively on important issues.243 Training by qualified teachers is available,
but some people become journalists because they think journalism is “glamorous,” and
they do not pursue training because it is not required.244 The lack of training and
professional requirements for journalists is one reason why some politicians suggest
journalists should not be trusted with wide access to information.
However, this reasoning can also be employed as an excuse not to pass a right to
information law, when in fact a lack of access to information likely perpetuates
sensationalism, particularly in the private media. If the media cannot access information to
verify their reports, they simply publish whatever they have.245 The Honorable E. Kwasi
Bandua, MP for the Biakoye constituency, predicts that when a right to information law is
passed and it is easier for media outlets to obtain information, there will likely be fewer
false reports in the media.246
6. Conclusion

Although statutory reform cannot address all of these obstacles, a right to
information law is necessary to ensure that Ghanaian citizens’ constitutional right to
information is realized. A right to information law can address governmental refusals to
See HASTY, supra note 43, at 94 (“Indeed, since its reemergence in the early 1990s, the private press tended
to emphasize personalities over policy, often preferring sensational and ad hominem stories at the expense of
balanced reporting and policy analysis.”). Another important consideration regarding journalists’ reporting,
particularly journalists for the state, is their relationship with their sources. Jennifer Hasty points out that
“journalists are trained at a vocational institute, while their sources are university-educated, creating a status
disparity that structures news assignments, especially invited assignments.” Id. at 352.
244 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224. It is also important to note that university students
rarely consider journalism as a career because it can be a dangerous profession, and it pays very little. HASTY,
supra note 43, at 102.
245 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202.
246 Id.
243
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disclose information, poor record keeping, professionalism, and many of the disparities
between the state-owned and private media by placing them on more equal footing. Such a
law could also reduce inequalities across the country by ensuring that information is made
available to all Ghanaian citizens, regardless of wealth and geography. A right to
information law is a crucial first step toward strengthening Ghana’s media and democratic
development.

C. The Right to Information Bill: A Promising Solution
1. The RTI Bill: Overview

Though Ghana does not yet have a statutory framework in place to address these
obstacles to the free flow of information, many government officials and civil society
groups—especially the Coalition on the Right to Information—have been pressing for legal
reform. In the wake of the 2012 elections, there is
cause for optimism that that a Right to Information
The Common Law
Ghana employs a common law
system, meaning that if Parliament does
not pass an RTI law, it would be
possible for a citizen to seek a judicially
crafted RTI system. However, such a
judicially crafted remedy is unlikely.
First, most of the affirmative guarantees
of the Constitution do not create a direct
cause of action.1 Second, judges would
be hesitant to venture into an area of
law traditionally seen as legislative.2
Therefore, if there is to be an RTI
system in Ghana, it will have to come
from Parliament.
1

Interview with Nene Amegatcher,
President, Ghana Bar Association, in Accra,
Ghana (Mar. 15, 2013).
2
Interview with Kwaku Agyeman Budu,
Lecturer of Law, GIMPA Law School, in
Accra, Ghana (Mar. 13, 2013).

Bill will finally be passed into law. Such a bill was
last proposed in 2009, and that proposal—while
imperfect—provides a good starting point from
which to evaluate future reforms. To date, no other
laws create a mechanism by which a citizen can
realize the right to information enshrined in the
Constitution. Thus, the RTI Bill is necessary to make
the Constitutional right to information a reality for
Ghanaian citizens. This Section explains the
constitutional underpinnings and structure of the
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most recent version of the RTI Bill,247 and offers various recommendations that might
improve the Bill further.
2. Constitutional Underpinnings

Article 21 of the Ghanaian Constitution contains provisions protecting various
personal liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion.248 Included in this
vast panoply of liberties is a personal right to information: “All persons shall have the right
to . . . information.”249 This guarantee is, however, “subject to such qualifications and laws
as are necessary in a democratic society.”250
The obvious question raised by this qualifying language is what limitations to access
to information are necessary in a democratic society. The proposed RTI Bill is an attempt to
answer this question, and to elaborate and codify that constitutional guarantee. The Bill’s
preamble states that its purpose is “to provide for the implementation of the constitutional
right to information.”251 Moreover, the preamble directly responds to the Constitution’s call
for such “laws as are necessary in a democratic society” by setting forth a series of
exemptions that are “necessary and consistent with the protection of the public interest in
a democratic society.”252 When passed into law, the Bill could give Ghanaian citizens a
concrete way to realize their constitutionally guaranteed right to information.

247 Currently only the 2009 version of the RTI Bill is publically available. While individual provisions or
specific language might change, the principles of the 2009 Bill remain the backbone of an adequate RTI
proposal. In any case, the 2009 version is the most recent version that the authors of this Report had access
to.
248 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 21(1).
249 Id. art. 21(1)(f).
250 Id.
251 Right to Information Bill (2010) (Ghana), pmbl.
252 Id.
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RTI in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s right to information law, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)1, is widely
criticized for controlling the media and suppressing free speech. This criticism comes in large part because of AIPPA’s
twelve categorical exemptions from the presumption of access to information. The AIPPA has some agency-based
exemptions for advice given to public bodies and deliberations of the Cabinet and local government bodies. Others are
subject-matter exemptions for information subject to client-attorney privilege, research information, information otherwise
available to the public, and information relating to: inter-governmental relations or negotiations, the financial or economic
interests of public bodies or of the State, conservation of heritage sites, personal safety, business interests of a third party,
and personal privacy. Finally, information is exempt if its divulgence would affect the law enforcement process and national
security.
Ghanaians frequently criticize the numerous broad exemptions in AIPPA, and they view Zimbabwe as an example that
Ghana should not follow.2 However, Ghana’s most current draft of the Right to Information Bill includes similar
exemptions to AIPPA, and Ghana’s draft contains one more exemption than AIPPA. For example, both bills contain blanket
exemptions for deliberations of the Cabinet and information relating to intergovernmental relations, business interests of a
third party, and law enforcement and national security. Moreover, like Zimbabwe’s bill, many of the exemptions in Ghana’s
RTI Bill include broad, vague language that unduly widens the scope of the exemptions. Instead, Ghana’s exemptions
should be “justified only if they are necessary to protect the public interest or the rights and freedoms of others.”3
1

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Chapter 10:27 (2002), available at http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/
article/96/ACCESS_TO_INFORMATION_AND_PROTECTION_OF_PRIVACY_ACT_10_27.pdf.
2
Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 12, 2013).
3
COALITION, supra note 214, at 5.

3. Structure of the RTI Bill

The RTI Bill imagines a right to information that centers on citizen petitions to
government agencies. In response to these petitions, the agency can divulge the
information sought or, for cause, reject the petition. Much of the Bill describes certain
classes of exempt information that falls outside the default position that all information
should be divulged. The Bill further specifies an appeals process for denied petitions, as
well as a fee structure for filing petitions.
Not all information disclosures depend on citizen petitions—the Bill places an
affirmative obligation on government to “make available to the people, general information
on their governance without application from a specific person.”253 However, this onesentence imperative lacks specificity beyond a reference to Article 67 of the Constitution,

253

Id. § 2.
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which requires the President to deliver a State of the Nation message to Parliament. It is
unclear if this aspirational provision will have any practical effect.
Aside from the “general information” disclosure requirement, the heart of the RTI
Bill is, as noted above, a system of citizen petitions for individual pieces of information.
Requests for information must be made in writing to the relevant government agency.254 If
an applicant is unable to write an application in English, the application can be made to a
government officer who will transcribe the request.255 Government agencies must
designate an information officer to handle all requests and must publish a manual detailing
the request procedure for that agency.256 Upon receiving the request, the government
information officer must decide whether to grant access to the information sought, grant
partial access, or reject the petition.257 If the information sought is in the possession of
another government agency, the information officer can transfer the request to the
appropriate agency.258 If the appropriate information officer denies a request, the
petitioner may appeal that decision to the Minister responsible for that government
agency.259 The decision of the Minister can be appealed to the Supreme Court.260
The default position of the Bill is that information should be granted.261 The Bill,
however, carves out thirteen classes of exempt information that the government need not
divulge in response to a petition. Some of these exemptions are agency-based: information
Id. § 19(1)(a).
Id. § 19(2)–(3).
256 Id. § 3.
257 Id. § 23.
258 Id. § 21.
259 Id. § 38.
260 Id. § 42.
261 Id. § 1(1)–(2) (“In accordance with . . . the Constitution, a person has a right of access to information or
part of an information in the custody or under the control of a government agency. . . . The exercise of [that
right] is subject to the exemptions specified in sections 5 to 18 [of the RTI Bill].”).
254
255
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is exempt if it comes from the Office of the President or Vice President,262 or from the office
of Cabinet Ministers.263 Other exemptions are based on the subject matter of the
information sought: information is exempt if it relates to “law enforcement, public safety
[or] national security,”264 if it would reveal economic information about third parties,265 or
if it pertains to privileged legal, medical or personal topics.266 Finally, information can be
exempted based on the consequences of divulgence: information is exempt if divulgence
would affect international relations267 or national defense,268 or if it would “create undue
disturbance in the ordinary course of business or trade in the country.”269
Further provisions of the Bill provide a timeline for rejecting or complying with a
request for information.270 Petitioners are required to pay a fee,271 and may be required to
pay an additional deposit if “the costs to the agency for dealing with the application are
likely to exceed the amount of the application fee.”272 However, fees can be waived in cases
of financial hardship.273 Finally, the Bill also lays out a mechanism for petitioning
government agencies to amend internal records.274

Id. § 5.
Id. § 6.
264 Id. § 7.
265 Id. § 11.
266 Id. § 14–17.
267 Id. § 8.
268 Id. § 9.
269 Id. § 10(c).
270 Id. § 23.
271 Id. § 19(1)(f).
272 Id. § 25(1).
273 Id. § 51.
274 Id. § 30–37.
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4. How the RTI Bill Addresses Obstacles to Accessing
Information
RTI Coalition
The Coalition on the Right to
Information is comprised of numerous
stakeholders in Ghana including the
primary convener, the Commonwealth
Human Rights Initiative, as well as
the National Media Commission, the
Ghana Bar Association, religious
organizations, journalists, and other
non-governmental organizations.1
Since 2010, the Coalition has
advocated for passage of the right to
information bill, and has marched in
front of Parliament twice in hopes of
pressuring lawmakers to take action.2
The Coalition sent a petition to
Parliament after its march, noting that
“access to information offers the key
to deepening democracy and
quickening development that Ghana is
seeking. It lays the foundation upon
which to build good governance,
transparency, accountability, and
eliminate corruption.”3

The RTI Bill aims to provide specific guidance
on how Ghana will fulfill its obligations to its people
and the fundamental right to access information. Yet,
lawmakers also recognize that the Bill must include
sufficient language to safeguard the right to
information, rather than create obstacles to full
realization of this fundamental right. The current draft
proposal is a positive step in safeguarding this right,
but it is not perfect. Amending the latest draft
proposal is necessary to create a framework that
provides both the media and Ghanaians with

1

http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/
programs/ai/rti/ghana/activities.htm
2
http://thechronicle.com.gh/rti-coalitionstorms-parliament/
3
Id.

meaningful access to information. This Report has
already identified the most salient barriers to access
to information in Ghana.275 This Section includes

recommendations for addressing these barriers, with particular focus on provisions within
the current proposal itself. For this reason, solutions to the extra-legal obstacles will not be
addressed.276 This Section identifies eight areas in which lawmakers can add or amend
language in the draft proposal to effectively provide solutions to the legal obstacles
identified. After a brief analysis of each problematic provision, this Section highlights

275
276

See supra Part IV.B.
See, e.g., supra Part IV.B.4.
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possible amendments to each section. These recommendations draw on the work of the
Coalition on the Right to Information.
a. Refusal to Share Information

As noted above, there is no law in Ghana guaranteeing public access to government
information.277 At the heart of the RTI Bill is an attempt to overcome the government’s
historic reluctance to disclose information to the public.278 Requiring government officials
to comply with valid requests for information is a critical legal step to overcoming cultural
and historical resistance to government transparency. The RTI Bill creates a system that
mandates government responsiveness to citizen requests for information. Requiring
compliance with a valid application is “one step towards making public officials responsive
to needs of the people.”279 It is imperative that the RTI Bill limit the discretion available to
government officials to deny requests “as necessary in a democratic society”280 or based on
other qualifications.
The current proposal contains too many exemptions and grants too much discretion
to government officials to deny requests. This is a significant obstacle and the exemptions
must be limited. The most current draft of the Bill provides 13 categorical exemptions, as
noted above.281 The broad scope of these exemptions has caused concern. Some lawmakers
and other stakeholders believe the exemptions are too numerous and “would undermine
the effectiveness of the Bill.”282 For example, the broad, categorical exemptions for the

See supra Part IV.A.
See Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202.
279 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29.
280 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 21.
281 See supra Part I.
282 Interview with Nene Amegatcher, supra note 23.
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offices of the President, Vice President, and Ministers “enable government and public
officials to withhold information when there is no necessity not to make disclosure.”283
Any exemptions in the bill should be “narrowly formulated and proportional to [a]
legitimate purpose.284 Rather than providing blanket exemptions for the offices of the
President, Vice President, and Ministers, these offices should be required to demonstrate “a
direct causal link” between disclosure and a sufficient harm to the public interest or the
rights and freedoms of others.285
Other exemptions include vague language that fails to provide a reasonable
limitation to the exemption. For example, Section 13 of the RTI Bill states that information
related to the internal work of agencies may be exempt from disclosure if disclosure would
reveal:
An opinion, an advice, a report or a recommendation contained,
prepared or recorded, or a consultation or a deliberation held in the
course of or for the purpose of making a decision in the public service
or an agency of the Government and which can reasonably be
expected to frustrate or inhibit the candid deliberative process of an
agency or between agencies is exempt information.286
This exemption does not require any causal relationship to any potential harm and
provides the opportunity to exempt critical information from disclosure without sufficient
justification.
b. Record Keeping

The fundamental right to information presupposes that information is accessible as a
practical matter. Yet accessibility is a significant obstacle to realizing this right in Ghana. As

COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra note 212, at 6.
Id.
285 Id. at 5.
286 Right to Information Bill § 13(2010) (Ghana).
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one lawmaker said, “Record keeping in this environment is very bad. This is central and it’s
a major problem.”287 A central part of this problem stems from the lack of compliance with
the Ghana Public Records and Archives Administration Act.288 Moreover, the current draft
of the RTI Bill does not contain any guidance on how government agencies should comply
with the Act. If this issue is not addressed directly, “the right to information becomes
illusory.”289 In 2012, an editorial in the state-owned newspaper the Daily Graphic urged the
government to amend the Public Records Act, stating that “the time has come for the
government to take a critical look at record-keeping in the country and encourage all
institutions to upgrade their record-keeping capabilities.” The RTI Bill should address this
issue effectively and provide sufficient language to reinforce the Public Records Act.290
c. Oversight by an Independent Entity & the Appeals Process

The RTI Bill provides that the “Minister responsible for Justice has ministerial
responsibility for the effective implementation of this Act.”291 This provision is potentially
problematic. The Minister of Justice has obligations to the government, but would also be
responsible for ensuring that the government adheres to its obligations under the RTI Bill.
These twin obligations are in tension and may conflict. Instead, the RTI Bill should mandate
oversight by an independent body in order to ensure fair and equitable treatment and
effective implementation of the RTI framework.292 This independent organ could also serve

Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202.
Ghana Public Records and Archives Administration Act, Act 535 (1997).
289 COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra note 212, at 19.
290 Id.
291 Right to Information Bill § 53 (2010) (Ghana).
292 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202; COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra
note 212, at 9.
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as an appellate tribunal to adjudicate disputes arising from denied requests for
information.293
Ideally, any disputes arising under the RTI regime would be handled
administratively rather than in the court system.294 This would provide efficient dispute
resolution without unduly burdening the judiciary. The current Bill provides for
administrative review by the minister responsible for the agency involved in the dispute.295
An applicant may then appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for further review.296 The
review mechanism, while laudable in many respects, could create practical impediments
for Ghanaians who lack substantial financial resources. Specifically, it could deter
applicants from challenging ministerial decisions because appealing to the Supreme Court
is costly and time-consuming.297 The review process can be improved by granting authority
to a senior officer in every agency to conduct internal reviews and by including a right of
appeal before the independent oversight organ prior to seeking judicial review.298
d. Fee Requirements

The Minister for Justice is responsible for setting fee requirements for applications
for information. The RTI Bill provides guidance on how the Minister should determine the
fees. Clause 50(3) states:
The guidelines shall specify the amount payable for
(a) a search for every hour or fraction of an hour of manual search
required in excess of two hours to locate the information,
(b) computer access and any other costs incurred in locating,
retrieving, processing and photo copying the information,
COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra note 212, at 9.
Id. at 10.
295 Right to Information Bill § 8 (2010) (Ghana).
296 Id. § 42.
297 COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra note 212, at 11.
298 Id.
293
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(c) the cost of preparing the information for disclosure, and
(d) the postage costs.299
The Bill also requires an advance deposit if the cost of producing the information is likely to
exceed the application fees.300 The Minister of the relevant agency may authorize a waiver
of the fee in cases where the applicant would suffer financial hardship if required to pay the
fee.301
The proposal’s current fee structure is overly complex and would impose undue
burdens on applicants. For example, the time it takes to retrieve information is a central
element of the fee structure, yet this would penalize applicants for the government’s
inefficient recordkeeping apparatus.302 At worst, fees should be limited to the “actual cost
of reproduction of information.”303 In addition, the decision to waive fees in accordance
with Clause 51 should not rest solely in the hands of the Minister. Rather, the information
officer or other senior officer should have the authority to grant waivers in appropriate
cases.304
e. Timely Access

Full realization of the fundamental right to information entails receiving the
information in a timely fashion. Applicants should reasonably expect public officials to
process their requests “as expeditiously as possible.”305 Undue delay renders this right
illusory, particularly in instances where the applicant, perhaps a journalist under the
pressure of a deadline, is unable to obtain the requested information in time to file a story.
Right to Information Bill § 50(3) (2010) (Ghana).
Id. § 25.
301 Id. § 51.
302 COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra note 212, at 12.
303 Id. at 12.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 13.
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In this context, timely access to information would incentivize accurate reporting and
reduce the number of false reports, thereby improving the quality of journalism in
Ghana.306 But the need for timely access is not limited to journalists—all applicants have a
right to receive, process, and act upon the information within a reasonable time.
The current Bill includes numerous time extensions. If all extensions were applied, it
could take more than five months for an applicant to receive the requested information.
This potential delay is unreasonable and subverts the right to information.307 Information
Officers should be required to respond to applications promptly, and time extensions
should be limited situations where they are strictly necessary. Their length, too, should be
limited.
f. Inclusion of Private Entities

A central tenet of the RTI Bill is that government should be held accountable to the
public. This accountability should extend to all government actors, including private
entities working on behalf of the government.308 As a consequence, the RTI Bill should
provide stronger language mandating access to information related to private entities that
are “funded by the public purse, carry out public actions, exploit the nation’s natural
resources, or where the information is required for the protection of an individual’s
fundamental human right or freedom.”309
The current proposal makes inclusion of private entities dependent upon an
additional legislative act.310 In this sense, the scope of the Bill is limited only to state-actors,

Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, supra note 51; see also Interview with Nene Amegatcher, supra note 23.
COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra note 212, at 14.
308 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29.
309 COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra note 212, at 15.
310 Right to Information Bill § 63 (2010) (Ghana).
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even where private entities operate within the public sphere. The Bill should be amended
to broaden the scope to include these private entities.
g. Affirmative Duty to Disclose Information

The Bill should provide greater clarity on the government’s affirmative legal duty to
disclose information independent of a citizen petition. While the proposal would require
disclosure of “general information” on governance,311 more clarity on what information is
required, and at what intervals it should be disclosed, is needed. Providing Ghanaians with
access to “accurate and timely information about important matters of governance”312 is an
important foundational step to demonstrate the government’s commitment to realizing the
fundamental right to information enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
h. Implementation

Enacting the RTI Bill will impose myriad requirements on state actors. Ministers will
have to create and distribute manuals on how the Bill operates within their respective
ministries, and Information Officers will need to be appointed to ensure compliance with
the Bill. Importantly, the government will have to improve its recordkeeping capacity in
order to provide the necessary information to applicants. Given the magnitude of the Bill’s
framework, implementation dates should be included in the Bill. Without a timeline for
implementation, Ghana will run the risk of having ineffectual legislation and expose itself to
liability for failure to comply with requests. Implementation dates could include specific
phases of implementation as well as a maximum time limit for enforcement.313
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Id. pmbl.

312 PREMPEH,
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supra note 42, at 55.
COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION – GHANA, supra note 212, at 18.
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The chart below summarizes the eight obstacles identified and briefly summarizes
this Report’s proposed solutions.
Table 3. Obstacles and Solutions in the RTI Bill
Obstacles Identified
Refusal to Share Information

Record Keeping
Oversight & Appeal

Fee Requirements

Timely Access

Solution
Limit exemptions and discretion granted to government officials;
Require direct link between exemptions and the harm sought to
be avoided
Reinforce and strengthen the Public Records Act
Create independent oversight body that has power to review
decisions upon appeal by an applicant prior to appeal in the
courts
Limit fees to the cost of reproducing the documents, rather than
including costs for retrieval time
Amend time limit provisions to ensure timely access to
information

Inclusion of Private Entities

Require compliance by private entities involved in state matters

Affirmative Duty to Disclose
Information

Provide greater clarity on what the state must disclose
independent of citizen requests, and how often it must disclose
this information

Implementation

Provide clear timeline for implementation of the RTI Bill
framework

The RTI Bill represents a significant step towards making Article 21 efficacious, and its
passage would signal a victory for Ghana, for fundamental human rights, and for
transparent governance. The RTI Bill would also bring the country into harmony with
international norms. It would enable the media to pursue more effectively its goals of
holding government responsible and informing Ghanaians of pertinent news in a timely
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fashion. Lawmakers have been considering the RTI Bill for several years, and many
stakeholders are optimistic a bill will pass through Parliament this year.
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V. Sharing Information Through Broadcast
While the RTI Bill centers on the right to receive information, the right to share
information is intimately connected. These two rights operate in tandem to influence
democratic government. In Ghana, the right to share information is dependent in large part
on the mediums by which Ghanaians receive news. Because radio is such a prominent
source of information across the country, providing a sufficient legal and regulatory
framework to guide the broadcast media is critical to ensuring information is shared
effectively.
Lawmakers first proposed a bill to provide comprehensive broadcast regulation in

Talking Drums
Talking drummers were the original Ghanaian broadcasters. They performed the critical task of communicating news
amongst neighboring villages, using the airwaves, and their broadcasts would range up to five miles.1 And for many generations
of Ghanaians, the talking drum was the primary source of news. In some rural villages, the talking drum was the primary means
of receiving and disseminating news up until the last decade of the 20th century.3 Though the mode of broadcasting has
changed, broadcasting’s importance to Ghanaian civil society has not.
1

ROBERT GARDNER & DENNIS SHORTELLE, FROM TALKING DRUMS TO THE INTERNET: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY 276 (1997).
2
Id.
3
Interview with Residents of Dogo, Ghana (Mar. 16, 2013).

2007, yet efforts stalled without producing a legislative enactment.314 Recently, President
John Dramani Mahama said that the government would prioritize the speedy passage of the
Broadcast Bill.315 This Section takes a closer look at the theoretical foundation of the

Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
Govt To Fast Track Passage Of Broadcasting Bill- President Mahama, GOV’T OF GHANA: OFFICIAL WEBSITE (Feb.
21, 2013) http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/general-news/20049-govt-to-fast-track-passage-ofbroadcasting-bill-president-mahama.
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Broadcast Bill, as well as obstacles to effective implementation of the Bill and this Report’s
proposed solutions to these obstacles.

A. The Importance of Sharing Information
The freedom to “impart information and ideas through any media” is recognized as
a universal human right.316 The right to impart information has been recognized as “one of
the most precious rights of man” for centuries.317 And, like generations before, the
international community today deeply cherishes that right. It is codified in several
international accords, including the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
American Convention on Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.318
The right to impart information is so highly regarded because it is fundamental to a
democratic society.319 The right to impart information facilitates citizens sharing and
critically engaging with each other’s ideas. Democratic societies thrive when various
viewpoints are expressed.320 The diversity of opinions and perspectives strengthens
democracy because, within the marketplace of ideas, good ideas flourish and bad ideas
fail.321 The right to impart information protects the ability of individuals to bring their
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Declaration of the Rights of Man art. 11 (1789), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp.
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unique ideas to the market.322 Without that right, the marketplace of ideas would be a
dilapidated dump devoid of ideas.
Broadcasting plays a critical role in maintaining a thriving marketplace of ideas.
Television and radio broadcasting command loyal audiences, filling the airwaves that
circulate information around the globe. Both television and radio broadcasting facilitate the
free flow of ideas, opinions, and information to citizens. These streams of information
enable citizens to effectively exercise other democratic rights, including the right to vote.
While radio and television broadcasting play an essential role in democratic development,
radio is by far the most popular and accessible medium for most Ghanaians.323 For this
reason, this Section focuses on radio broadcasting. The remainder of the Section will
consider the relationship between radio broadcasting and the right to information by
examining (1) radio’s exceptionalism, (2) models of radio broadcasting, (3) approaches to
radio regulation, and (4) convergence.
1. Radio Exceptionalism

Radio broadcasting is an exceptional medium. It is among the world’s most popular
broadcasting mediums, and there are no signs that radio’s growing prominence will slow
down.324 Radio’s sustained preeminence amongst its peer mediums is a consequence of
several factors. Unlike other electronic mediums, radio broadcasts are accessible in most
parts of the world, from sprawling metropolises to bucolic homesteads.325 Around the
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globe, there are more than 20,000 radio stations and 2 billion radio receivers.326 For the
775 million adults and 122 million youths around the world who are illiterate, radio is the
primary means for receiving news and entertainment.327 Call-in programs have also
contributed to radio’s primacy. Through these programs, listeners can phone their station
to express their opinions about an issue.328 Economically, radio is affordable for both
listeners and station owners.329 Because of radio’s reach, affordability, and popularity,
radio broadcasts are a critical medium through which the right to impart information is
realized.
2. Models of Radio Broadcasting

Within the world of broadcasting, there are three dominant broadcasting sectors:
commercial, community, and public.330 Each sector plays a specific role in the realization of
the right to impart information.
a. Commercial

Private individuals or enterprises operate commercial radio stations. The rise of
commercial radio is in part a reaction to a deep distrust of state intervention in
broadcasting, which is seen as “dangerous” and a threat to the freedom to impart
information.331 Private individuals, rather than the state, must have full control over
editorial content to fully realize the right to impart information. In practice, private
broadcasters can largely make decisions about content independent of the state. They do
326
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not, however, have unlimited discretion to determine content. All programming decisions
must be consistent with their country’s broadcasting laws. Additionally, the programming
is driven in large part by concerns about how to attract more listeners.332 Larger audiences
translate into more advertising revenue. Broadly speaking, private broadcasting facilitates
media pluralism.333 As media pluralism increases, wider arrays of ideological and political
viewpoints are reflected in the media.334 Thus, private broadcasters are providing greater
opportunities for “more voices to be heard.”335
b. Community

In most cases, community radio stations are non-profit organizations that focus on
the “special interests and needs . . . of the [communities they are] licensed to serve.”336
Community broadcasters draw directly on the support of their community members to
participate in the management, operation, and programming of the station.337 Community
radio is different from a public service broadcaster, discussed below, because the targeted
audience is much smaller. The public broadcasters’ intended target is the entire nation,338
whereas the community broadcaster is limited to its relevant, specific community.339 “A
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community is considered a group of people who share common characteristics and/or
interests.”340 Those shared characteristics can be based on language, ethnicity, geographic
region, or even economic livelihood. At its core, community radio is motivated by a desire
to “treat its listeners as subjects and participants.”341 To that end, community radio
advocates have sought to ensure that members of the community contribute funding to the
stations so as to maintain independence from political or economic interests.342
c. Public

Public broadcasting has been defined as “a meeting place where all citizens are
welcome and considered equal.”343 State-supported or state-owned corporations generally
oversee public broadcasting and seek to promote these laudable goals.344 The pillars of
universality, diversity, independence, and distinctiveness underpin public broadcasting.
Universality refers to securing access for every citizen in the country. Diversity is a
commitment to varied program genres, target audiences, and discussion subjects.
Independence underscores public broadcasting’s commitment to a robust exchange of
ideas. And distinctiveness “requires that the service offered by public broadcasting
distinguish itself from that of other broadcasting services.”345 These core commitments to
universality, diversity, independence, and distinctiveness inform public broadcasting’s
primary purpose. Public broadcasting is intended to be an “information and education
tool.”346 Its goal is to further citizens’ understanding so they can make informed

340

Id.
Id.
342 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
343 UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., PUBLIC BROADCASTING: WHY AND HOW, supra note 331, at 7..
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Id.
341

79

decisions.347 The state-owned corporations that run public broadcasting stations develop
the broadcasting policies and programming and receive the majority of their funding from
license fees.348 State supported broadcasters are not to be confused with government
broadcasters. The duty of loyalty for public broadcasters is to the public, not to the
presiding political party.349
3. Approaches to Regulation

Because of its exceptional nature, radio broadcasting has been recognized as “the
most powerful means of communication in the world.”350 Neither states nor private
interests have overlooked the power of radio broadcasting.351 Since the inception of
broadcasting, states and commercial interests have sought to harness its power for their
own ends. To prevent monopolization by either the state or commercial interests, various
broadcasting regulations have attempted to limit their influence. These regulations are
premised on the idea that the radio airwaves are a public good.352 According to
international treaties, nations are assigned a limited spectrum for broadcasting, making the
nation’s airwaves a scarce and valuable good.353 Because radio broadcasters are taking
advantage of a public good, they assume an obligation to use it fairly and judiciously for the
public’s benefit.354 To ensure that broadcasters are fulfilling their obligation, states have
utilized three different regulatory tools: frequency allocation, content regulation, and
structural regulation.
347
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a. Frequency Allocation

The state’s most powerful tool is frequency allocation and associated technical
requirements. Radio stations are mandated to transmit at a “certain power, wattage, [and]
on a precise frequency within a particular market.”355 The process that radio broadcasters
must go through in order to transmit at a certain frequency is known as licensing.356
Licenses authorize broadcasters to transmit on a particular frequency for a specified period
of time.357 Each country takes a different approach to licensing. Some countries sell
licenses.358 Others hold competitions.359 And still others simply give licenses away.360
Though states have different policies regarding how a broadcaster can obtain a license,
most countries decline to permanently sell airwaves because they would lose the power to
use a related tool: content regulation.
b. Content Regulation

Content regulation is about “protection.”361 On the one hand, states protect the
public’s right to share information without state interference, and on the other, they
protect the public from being harmed and offended.362 States design content regulations to
balance these dual objectives. Through standards that emphasize accuracy and
independence, states can ensure that broadcasters remain accountable to the public. For
those broadcasters that fail to comply with states’ standards, states have a gradation of
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disciplinary procedures that they can exercise. Generally, states will first fine a broadcaster
for noncompliance, then suspend the broadcaster’s license, and, finally, revoke its license.
c. Structural Regulation

States employ structural regulation to keep broadcasters from abdicating their
responsibility to the public. Scholars have noted that monopolies pose the gravest threat to
public interest in the broadcasting realm.363 Though not all owners will interfere in a
broadcaster’s editorial decisions, “ownership always implies a degree of actual or potential
control and it can be an obstacle to pluralism and diversity.”364 Structural regulations are
designed to promote diversity of ownership and to prevent the rise of broadcasting
monopolies. Structural regulation achieves this goal by limiting both where and when
media companies can enter certain markets. The restrictions imposed on when players can
enter certain markets have an added benefit: diversity of broadcasting ownerships
encourages diverse programming.
Countries that have an independent broadcasting sector generally have an
independent regulator to monitor that sector.365 Having an independent regulator ensures
that the state will not interfere in the licensing process.366 In some countries, however, the
ruling government oversees the licensing process.367 In many of these countries, the
broadcasters who are appointed tend to overwhelmingly support the ruling government.368
An independent regulatory body avoids this political quicksand.369 If the independent
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regulatory body is established by statute, then it will shore up public confidence in the
regulator and licensing process. This, in turn, reinforces the public’s faith in the accuracy
and objectivity of the information being broadcast.
4. Future Developments: Convergence

Convergence is transforming the broadcasting landscape. Convergence is the
combination of “all types of media in digital form.”370 Before digitization, television, radio,
telephone, and the internet each utilized a distinct band to transmit their frequencies.371
The meteoric advancements in 4-G technology have allowed different television, radio,
phone, and internet waves to be transmitted on a single frequency.372 The blurring of
boundaries between traditional mediums has changed how radio broadcasters
communicate to their audiences. Radio broadcasts can be heard on computers, mobile
phones, televisions, and tablets. Convergence accelerates this integration. It has changed
not only how broadcasters communicate to their audiences, but also who is communicating
to those audiences.
There has been media consolidation at the international, national, and local levels,
which has led to a decline in ownership diversity. The rapid changes wrought by
convergence in broadcasting have left regulators in a quandary, challenging the
fundamental assumptions that underlie present regulatory frameworks.373 The digitization
of media is transforming the spectrum of airwaves from a scarce public good into an

370 John

V. Pavlik, Understanding Convergence and Digital Broadcasting Technologies for the Twenty-First
Century, NKH Broadcasting Studies No. 4, at 131 (2005), available at
http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/english/reports/pdf/05_no4_08.pdf.
371 Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241.
372 SALOMON, supra note 318, at 99.
373 Id.

83

abundant one. Regulators no longer have exclusive control to allocate frequencies.
Broadcasters can circumvent regulatory authorities by broadcasting online. 374
In response to the convergence revolution, many governments have empowered a
single regulatory body to tend to the new broadcasting landscape.375 Ghana’s most recent
proposed broadcasting legislation fails to heed this international trend. The wisdom of
Ghana’s decision to depart from the international community on regulation is yet to be
seen. What is certain is that lawmakers’ decisions regarding convergence and other issues
of broadcasting regulation will have lasting implications on Ghana’s marketplace of ideas.

B. Obstacles to Information-Sharing
As previously discussed, more than 35 percent of the Ghanaian population is
illiterate,376 meaning that a significant number of citizens do not have access to the
country’s increasingly robust print media.377 Radio, as a consequence, is one of the fastest
growing instruments of mass communication in the nation378 and the most trusted form of
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media for most Ghanaians.379 The majority of Ghanaians are dependent on the broadcast
sector for crucial information concerning state affairs and local politics.380 Thus, obstacles
to the free dissemination of information are particularly salient in their impact on radio
broadcasting.
Nevertheless, there exists a troubling absence of constitutionally adequate means
for allocating frequency to radio stations.381 This absence not only endangers the viability
of broadcasters themselves, but also imperils the necessary access to information that
forms the bedrock of a constitutional democracy. The need for rational and effective
broadcasting regulation in Ghana has never been more crucial. On its success hangs the
possibility of lasting growth and stability. This Section outlines the most pressing obstacles
confronting the ability to share information through radio broadcasting in Ghana.
1. Inequalities Across the Country

Though radio is by far the most popular medium in Ghana, the population’s access
to radio—and broadcasters’ ability to establish broadcasting stations—varies significantly
across the nation. There are a number of obstacles to radio penetration across Ghana. For
one, most Ghanaians, particularly outside of urban centers, do not speak English, which is
the primary broadcast language.382
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Moreover, the rural-urban divide erects significant hurdles to establishing and
sustaining broadcasting networks throughout much of the country. With 52.2 percent of
Ghanaians living in rural areas, these hurdles affect the majority of Ghanaians.383 One
reason for limited broadcasting viability in rural regions is that private radio stations are
dependent on advertising revenue, but most advertisers target the urban centers of Greater
Accra, Kumasi, and Tema.384 In 2002, ten years after the broadcast sector was liberalized,
four of the nation’s ten regions had two or fewer on-air private radio stations.385 These
disparities in broadcast coverage remain largely unchanged today.386 Community radio is
an important tool for addressing these obstacles and for protecting rural populations’ right
to communicate. However, legal hurdles to the successful dissemination of community
radio remain entrenched.
2. Lack of a Clear National Regulatory & Policy Framework

The current regulatory regime is primarily a result of historical happenstance rather
than considered legislative or constitutional judgment.387 Broadcasting is regulated by two
agencies whose authority seems to conflict—the National Media Commission (NMC), an
independent constitutional body tasked with the appointment of state-owned media
management and regulation of broadcasting content, and the National Communication
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Authority (NCA), a state agency overseen by the executive that has authority over
frequency allocation but does not regulate content.388
Unlike the independent press, “independent broadcasting was born in controversy,
litigation and political tension.”389 After the 1992 Constitution created the NMC, the
military regime, unhappy with the NMC’s authority to appoint the management of stateowned media institutions, created the Frequency Registration and Control Board (FRCB) to
handle media appointments.390 The FRCB managed the transition from a single-media state
to democratic governance and was given the authority to assign broadcast frequencies. The
Supreme Court eventually upheld the NMC’s right to appoint state-owned media
management, but the FRCB retained authority to allocate frequencies.391 With the passage
of the National Communication Authority Act in 1996, the FRCB became the NCA, which
absorbed the FRCB and its functions.392 In short, the NCA is an agency born out of
government opposition to the NMC’s mandate.393
Today, both the NMC and NCA exercise control over the broadcasting sector, but
there is no formal legal framework for their interaction or cooperation.394 As Professor
Audrey Gadzekpo bemoans, “more than 14 years since independent broadcasting became
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an integral and vital part of the social and political environment, Ghana lacks a
comprehensive broadcasting law that sets out clearly the legal framework to regulate this
important resource.”395 This is not for a want of plausible comprehensive proposals, which
can be traced back to at least 1993.396
Under the status quo, the NCA authorizes and assigns radio frequencies, while the
NMC creates content standards for broadcasters and monitors the performance of the
sector.397 Though the NMC nominally regulates broadcast content, it has no legal authority
to issue fines or sanctions or to terminate frequency authorizations.398 According to many
in the sector, the majority of content problems within broadcasting are related to
professionalism.399 Without enforcement power over professionalism standards, the trend
of “media practitioners . . . refus[ing] to co-operate with institutions such as the National
Media Commission set up to protect and regulate them”400 will continue unchecked. Yet the
NMC has no means of enforcing professional standards. Currently, it is merely a hortatory
body whose directives can be ignored by broadcasters with impunity.401 The NCA, on the
other hand, is a powerful regulatory authority that has nearly unchecked discretion in its
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allocation of frequencies through a process lacking transparency.402 Some charge that this
discretion results in politically unpopular voices being suppressed, though others say that
the evidence does not confirm a political bias in frequency allocations.403 The troubling
reality is that there is currently no mechanism in place to appeal a decision of the NCA
denying (or failing to act on) an application for a frequency authorization.404 For example, a
number of community radio stations have had frequency applications pending with the
NCA for over two years with no action or explanation.405 The laws governing the NCA
establish criteria for the issuance of broadcast frequencies, but individual applicants
cannot compel the NCA to grant an application upon satisfaction of these criteria.
Combined with the fact that the NCA “lacks autonomy from the Executive because most
members of its board, including the chairman, are appointed by government,”406 this
unreviewable authority is particularly worrisome. A widely followed private radio station,
Oman FM, has experienced unexplained, long-term jamming and transmission interference
over the past few months, which it attributes to the NCA.407 These incidents illustrate the
unworkability of the current NCA regulatory regime.
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Radio’s Role in the 2008 Elections
Before the Electoral Commission announced the official results of the December 2008 presidential elections, Accra radio
station Joy FM announced that the new president would be John Atta Mills, the NDC Candidate, even though all of the runoff votes had not yet been counted. NDC supporters celebrated on the streets, while the governing NPP declared that this
announcement was “highly speculative and premature.” Other radio stations soon joined—either inciting listeners or praising
Joy’s declaration. At the time, GBC polls showed the NPP candidate Nana Akufo-Addo slightly ahead.
Many felt that Joy’s actions embodied irresponsible journalism—the type of sensationalist coverage designed to stir up
public sentiment rather than carefully report facts. The NMC was unable to take any action to restrain the stations, and
the NCA claimed that it had no authority to regulate the content of the broadcasts. From Joy’s perspective, however, this
is exactly what American networks do on the first Tuesday of November every four years—CNN, Fox News, ABC, NBC,
and CBS all analyze complex polling data and incoming results in order to make near-certain predictions. Joy had set up a
complex system of over 500 correspondents to collect polling and voting data from across the country, so it was very
confident in its information. Regardless of who is right, it is clear that radio has had and will continue to have a pivotal role
in Ghanaian elections.
Adapted from information in Seyram Avle, Global Flows, Media and Developing Democracies: The Ghanaian Case, 3 J. AFRICAN MEDIA
STUDIES, no. 1 (2011), at 7; KATHRYN MEISSNER, FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION, ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT IN GHANA: COUNTRY
ANALYSIS (2010), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07676.pdf; Ghana Opposition Claims Poll Win, BBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2008,
14:55 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7804212.stm; 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Result, MY JOY ONLINE,
http://elections.myjoyonline.com/results_main.php?election=6.

While the NCA has authority to review applications and assign broadcast
frequencies, it does not have any authority over content, and thus does not revoke licenses
when content standards are violated. The conflicting roles of the two agencies and their
collective inability to monitor broadcast content has prompted some to point out that “you
can’t divorce content from technology,”408 because “frequency acts as the platform on
which content is carried.”409
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This incompatibility is particularly confusing in the realm of community radio
regulation. Because “the body (NCA) that formulated the guideline for community radio is
different from the one (NMC) implementing the guideline, it is difficult for the regulatory

Radio Oman
The Daily Guide reports that Kencity Media, an operator of several private television and radio stations,
experienced frequent interference with its radio and television signals during the 2012 elections.1 Among other private
stations, Kencity Media operates Oman FM, which was identified by the Media Foundation for West Africa in its
report on electoral campaign language as the station responsible for the greatest number of indecent expressions.2
Indecent expressions were particularly concentrated in two popular programs, National Agenda and Boiling Point.3
Interference with Oman FM frequencies began several months before the elections and has continued into 2013.4
The station believes that the NCA is responsible for intentionally and illegally jamming its airwaves because the timing
of interference evinces a “consistent and sustained effort”5 to block “particular personalities or … subject[s].”6 The
NCA denied these allegations in a press release, stating that an investigation was conducted and concluding that the
allegations were unfounded.7 The NCA also claimed that the type of interference alleged by Kencity Media was not
even within its technical capacity.8 The experience of Oman FM, which remains unresolved, has led private-sector
journalists in particular to worry that “freedom of expression and the press are, with impunity, being pushed to the
backburners.”9
1
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Press Release, Media Foundation for West Africa, MFWA’s Second Quarter Findings on Monitoring Electoral Campaign Language
on Radio (Nov. 5, 2012), available at http://www.mediafound.org/en/?p=3037. The term “indecent expressions” includes insulting
and offensive comments, unsubstantiated allegations, comments promoting divisiveness, expressions containing tribal slurs, prejudice,
bigotry, or gender-specific indecency, and other types of inflammatory remarks. Id.
3
Id.
4
See Oman FM Cries Foul: Our Radio Frequency is being Jammed, GHANA REPORTERS (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://ghanareporters.com/2012/04/19/oman-fm-cries-foul-our-radio-frequency-is-being-jammed/; A. R. Gomda, Oman FM Writes to
NCA Again, DAILY GUIDE, Feb. 15, 2013, available at http://www.dailyguideghana.com/?p=74614.
5
Gomda, supra note 4.
6
Gagging Our Voices, DAILY GUIDE, Feb. 7, 2013, available at http://www.dailyguideghana.com/?p=74194.
7
Press Release, Nat’l Comm. Authority, NCA Response – Interferance [sic] with NET2 TV signals (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.nca.org.gh/73/34/News.html?item=285.
2

body to regulate community radios as all they can do is work within the available
framework (which is ambiguous).”410 Ambiguity in terms of which stations can be classified
as community radio based on urban or rural localities, broadcast language, content, and
ownership structure creates complex tension between the NMC and NCA.
Informal cooperation between the two bodies has recently emerged. Some in the
broadcasting sector attribute good election coverage by the media in 2012, in part, to this
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Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 202.

91

informal cooperation.411 While this trend is positive, it points once again to the lack of any
formal mechanism for cooperation between the two agencies that would ensure the two
bodies work together to monitor content and to allocate frequencies in a consistently fair
and transparent manner.
3. Inequitable Frequency Allocation

Access to the airwaves is provided through the allocation of frequencies, a limited
public good. It is incumbent upon allocating authorities to establish open and participatory
means for equitably distributing frequencies. The 2001 African Charter on Broadcasting
(the “Charter”) states that frequencies should be equitably distributed among the three
broadcasting sectors – commercial, public and community.412 Ghanaian law adopted the
three-tiered broadcasting structure and the mandate for equitable distribution with the
passage of the National Media Policy in 2000 and the National Telecommunication Policy in
2005.413 All three media sectors are tasked with “meet[ing] the information, education, and
entertainment needs of the public and promot[ing] national identity and culture despite
their ownership structure.”414 However, public and commercial radio stations are largely
unable to meet these public needs due to their funding and organizational structures.415 As
a result, community radio has become the primary medium “for the empowerment of

Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241.
Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28; United Nations Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org., African
Charter on Broadcasting (Windhoek Declaration) part I, 1-4, May 5, 2001, available at
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/5628/10343523830african_charter.pdf/african%2Bcharter.pd.
413 Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 195; MINISTRY OF COMM., NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY §2.2, 2005,
available at http://www.nca.org.gh/downloads/Ghana_Telecom_Policy_2005.pdf.
414 Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 195.
415 Id.
411

412
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marginalized communities” and “has the potential of enhancing participatory democracy
and bridging the information gap.”416
Community radio has become the principal news medium available to the 52.2
percent of Ghanaians who live in rural areas; it helps bridge “the digital divide between the
‘information haves’ and ‘information haves not [sic].’”417 In the context of the national
inequalities noted above, the community radio movement seeks to vindicate the rights of

Radio Ada
Established in 1998 by Alex and Wilna Quarmyne, Radio Ada is Ghana’s premier community radio station
and the first member of the Ghana Community Radio Network. The radio station’s facilities were donated by the
couple, and are located in Big Ada in Mr. Quarmyne’s native Dangme Region.
Radio Ada is staffed almost entirely by volunteers, yet the station is on air 17 hours per day and boasts an
array of programs on topics ranging from local environmental issues, to news reviews, to youth shows with youth
broadcasters, to call in shows, and programs on gender equality. Radio Ada’s broadcast range reaches about 600,000
people, many of whom are illiterate.1 The station engages these listeners by broadcasting in their native Dangme
language.
Building upon the definition found in the 2001 African Charter on Broadcasting, Radio Ada’s founders
define community broadcasting as “broadcasting which is for, by, about, and of a specific marginalized community,
whose ownership and management is representative of the community, which pursues a participatory social
development agenda and which is non-profit, non-sectarian, and non-partisan.” Firm believers that “the least voiced
have the greatest right to communicate”, the Quarmynes and other community advocates see community radio as a
means of empowerment that gives a voice to the voiceless by providing a forum where they can express their opinions
and have those opinions heard.2
1
White, George. “Community Radio in Ghana: The Power of Engagement,” UCLA Center for Communications &
Community, C3 Online, 2007. http://www.c3.ucla.edu/research-reports/reports-archive/editors-perspective/communityradio-in-ghana; Quarmyne, Wilna. A “Kente” Approach to Community Radio Training: Weaving Training into the
Community Empowerment Process,” The First International Workshop on Farm Radio Broadcasting, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Corporate Document Repository, 2001.
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6721e/x6721e30.htm.
2

Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, March 11, 2013.

rural and marginalized populations to receive information and to communicate.418

416

Id.
Id.
418 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28. The right to communicate encompasses not only an
individual’s right to express herself and her opinions, but also one’s right to have her opinions taken into
account. “Community radio plays an indispensible role in media because it responds to the needs of the
community.” Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224.
417
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Unlike most public and commercial stations, community radio stations broadcast in
rural and remote communities, primarily in local languages. Community radio
programming, determined by community members, attempts to address needs and issues
specific to the targeted communities. In many communities served by community radio
stations, the stations are the primary source of news and information from the rest of the
country.419
Despite legislation calling for equitable distribution of frequencies among the three
broadcasting sectors, community radio stations in Ghana continue to struggle to obtain a
fair distribution of frequencies. The Ghana Community Radio Network (GCRN), founded in
1999, seeks to cover all ten regions of Ghana with community radio stations, particularly in
resource-rich areas of the country where vulnerable communities tend to be excluded from
discussions over resource use and distribution.420 However, only eight of Ghana’s ten
regions currently have community radio stations.421
Community radio stations have historically faced significant regulatory and political
obstacles to their establishment and operation. When broadcasting was first liberalized in
Ghana, all frequencies were distributed to commercial broadcasters.422 In 2005, the
National Telecommunications Policy stated that any community radio station with a
pending frequency application with the NCA should receive an expedited review of its
application and obtain a frequency within six months.423 Before the 2005 act, broadcasting

Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Ministry of Comm., National Telecommunications Policy § 2.3.
419
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guidelines for community radio significantly restricted their reach.424 For example,
community radio stations were prohibited from broadcasting any political information,
including the names of political officials.425 Additionally, community radio stations could
not earn any revenue and had to limit their coverage to a five-kilometer radius.426 NCA
guidelines have since been recast to adopt the GCRN’s definition of community radio and to
allow community radio stations to generate revenue.427 However, the updated guidelines
retain the five-kilometer transmission restriction.428 The transmission restriction, if
enforced, would render all community radio stations ineffective and unable to reach their
target communities.429 It would require the nation’s most well-known and well-regarded
community radio station, Radio Ada, to shut down.430
The NCA’s community radio guidelines are not currently enforced. Thirty-seven of
the currently designated community radio stations do not meet the definition enshrined in
the guidelines. Despite the directive to grant community radio station applications within
six months, many applications have been pending for years, while commercial station
applications in rural regions receive prompt approval.431 Inequitable distribution has been
exacerbated in part by confusion over the definition of community radio stations. Under
the status quo, most rural stations are categorized as community radio stations and urban

Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
Id.
426 Id.
427 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28; Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 201.
428 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28; Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 201.
429 Radio Ada currently broadcasts to a range of about 50 miles and reaches over 600,000 people in about 150
towns and villages. Interview with Isaac Djagbletey, Station Coordinator, Radio Ada, in Ada, Ghana (Mar. 16,
2013). See also, George White, Community Radio in Ghana: The Power of Engagement, UCLA Center for
Communications and Community (2007), http://www.c3.ucla.edu/research-reports/reportsarchive/editors-perspective/community-radio-in-ghana.
430 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28; Interview with Isaac Djagbletey, supra note 429.
431 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
424

425
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stations are commercial, regardless of the communities they serve.432 Similar confusion
exists regarding stations that broadcast in local languages, which are widely classified as
community radio stations regardless of broadcast content.433 This classification is
particularly inaccurate in the wake of the 2009 Guidelines for Local Language Broadcasting
(“2009 Guidelines”), after which most radio stations broadcast in local languages.434 The
confusion makes it difficult for the NMC to effectively regulate community radio435 and
causes broadcasters to complain about a lack of transparency in the frequency distribution
process.436
Inequitable frequency distribution remains a problem today. There are currently
247 authorized commercial stations, run by thirty-seven commercial broadcasters;437
twelve on-air community radio stations, with eleven stations pending approval by the
NCA;438 and eleven public FM stations, in addition to the national GBC station.439
4. Structural Obstacles
a. Media Consolidation and Foreign Ownership

A serious threat to the right to impart information in modern Ghana is media
consolidation among a few corporate owners. For example, the Multimedia Company
dominates the independent radio sector and presents a risk of monopolization of the

Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 199.
Id. at 201.
434 Id. at 202.
435 Id. at 199.
436 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
437 Id.
438 These 12 stations are those that meet the GCRN’s “community radio” definition, which narrower than the
NCA’s definition. The GCRN definition is “broadcasting which is for, by, about, and of a specific marginalized
community whose ownership and management is representative of the community, which pursues a
participatory social development agenda and which is non-profit, non-sectarian, and non-partisan.” Id. The 11
stations awaiting a frequency have had applications pending for over two years. Id.
439 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224.
432
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airwaves.440 Some believe that the main threat to media freedom in Ghana no longer comes
from government but from private media and media owners who dictate messages and can
hire and fire at will.441
Similarly, the prospect of foreign ownership of media outlets is currently the source
of much debate in Ghana. On the one hand, some fear that foreign ownership and control of
media messages and content threatens Ghana’s cultural autonomy. Others believe that
foreign investment is necessary to develop Ghanaian media outlets and improve media
quality.442
b. Convergence

Increasing digital convergence of broadcast frequencies raises new issues and
obstacles for regulators. In the past, the limits of pre-compression technology sharply
restricted the number of stations that could transmit over the airwaves. Today, as digital
convergence increasingly becomes the norm, a new obstacle is emerging: transmission
companies operate as bottlenecks to the ability to share information.443 Fewer
transmission companies are now capable of controlling much more of the access to the
airwaves and are capable of shutting down entire swathes of the media.444 This
phenomenon is thought by some to pose one of the biggest dangers to freedom of
expression in Ghana’s current media environment.445

440 The Multimedia Group owns such well-known stations as JOY FM, Adom FM, and LOVE FM. Our Brands,
Multimedia Group Ghana (last accessed May 6, 2013), http://www.multimediaghana.com/brands.html.
441 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224.
442 Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Id.
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Increased involvement in broadcasting by transmission companies also poses the
regulatory issue of whether liability for content should lie with the content producer or the
content transmitter (the transmission company). If liability lies with the content
transmitter, transmission companies would assume the role of censoring content creators.
This would require content regulators (the NMC) to legally insulate transmission
companies from government influence and to clarify companies’ relationships with content
creators.446 Convergence creates a power imbalance between transmission companies and
broadcasting networks that risks echoing Ghana’s history of government control of the
airwaves, but with a corporate twist.
5. Extra-legal and cultural obstacles

Many stakeholders feel that the lack of training required to practice journalism
hinders professionalism, which in turn hinders the production of high-quality broadcasting.
According to the current Executive Secretary of the NMC, 95 percent of problems with the
media can only be addressed through training.447 In an era of burgeoning private
broadcasting, the “problem is how to marry freedom with responsibility.”448 For example,
some broadcasters with no journalistic experience are hired based on the appeal of their
voices.449 Moreover, many radio anchors on non-English stations lack formal education and
go on air without preparing a written program beforehand.450 It is common for
newscasters on many daily radio shows to simply summarize the news headlines or
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Id.
Id.
448 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224.
449 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
450 Interview with Margaret Amoakohene, supra note 393.
447

98

important articles from major newspapers, or read them aloud to their audiences.451 Many
politicians denounce private journalists as unprofessional sensationalists who promote
defamatory rumors for the sake of attracting more listeners.452
In the absence of enforceable professionalism regulations, some broadcast networks
develop their own trainings and guidelines. Prior to the 2012 election, the GRCN and its
membership established a community code of radio conduct as well as a “people’s
manifesto” outlining party platforms, parliamentary candidate “scorecards” listing criteria
for evaluating candidates, and a requirement that member stations give political parties
equal air time.453
The GJA and the NMC have created ethical guidelines for the private media, but
complain that “the level of respect for these guidelines is zero” because private media
ignores important issues in favor of sensationalized stories.454 Because the law does not
currently permit punitive measures or sanctions, the only enforcement remedy the NMC
and the GJA’s ethics and disciplinary authority has is “naming and shaming.”455
Among the other informal obstacles to extensive media freedom is the residual selfcensorship caused by the post-colonial decades of government oppression and control.
This leads to a “culture of silence”456 in which journalists refrain from reporting stories that
are politically damaging to those in power or that might be embarrassing to the ruling
elites. The ensuing neglect leaves citizens uninformed about some of the most
Cf. Temin & Smith, supra note 46, at 596 (noting that the media “still lack in-depth examination of the
events they report”).
452 E.g., Prez Mahama Is Right: Stop the “Lazy” Morning Shows on Radio, PEACE FM ONLINE (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://elections.peacefmonline.com/politics/201303/159455.php.
453 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
454 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224.
455 Id.
456 GHANA NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 185.
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consequential political events affecting government operations.457 Like several of the other
obstacles outlined here, the culture of silence is not easily resolved though legal reforms.
Yet the proposed solutions that follow do offer hope that most obstacles can be remedied
by effective regulations—concerns regarding professionalism, for example, might be
mitigated if journalists had better access to information and better ways to share it without
resorting to sensationalism.458

C. The Broadcast Bill: A Needed Reform
Despite general agreement on the major problems identified, several fundamental
disagreements lie at the heart of proposed solutions. This Section focuses on the ways in
which proposed broadcast regulations affect radio broadcasters, though these proposals
inevitably affect television and other broadcasting. While some obstacles resist easy legal
solutions, many of those identified—involving agency competition and competence,459
media consolidation,460 and ideologically-motivated frequency allocation461—can be
squarely addressed by a coherent set of broadcasting regulations. This Section specifically
focuses on a 2007 proposal for a broadcasting bill, which would address the two main tasks
of broadcasting regulation—technical allocation and content monitoring (including

457 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 26–27 (“Pandering to a false notion that people do not like politics, private
broadcasting stations are failing to deliver quality news and current affairs programs that offer diversity,
pluralism and real information to people on important national issues.”)
458 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202.
459 This is a constant source of contention, where “[a]dvocates of media pluralism have argued that, in
accordance with the Constitution, the NMC has the responsibility for administering broadcast frequencies;
however the government has maintained that responsibility for administering all radio frequencies properly
lies with a state administrative body.” Heath, supra note 392, at 513.
460 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 27 (“The independent radio sector is dominated by the Multimedia Company,
owners of JOY FM.”).
461 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.
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structural regulation).462 After analyzing the proposal, the Section highlights the ways in
which each addresses or fails to address the obstacles identified.463
1. The 2007 Broadcasting Bill Proposal

The 2007 Broadcasting Bill Proposal presents several possible answers to the
problems of regulating a quickly expanding broadcast medium.464 Though the proposal is
slightly outdated and may no longer represent a live legislative option, it is important for
several reasons. First, it is one of the few proposals (and the first one of which the authors
of this Report are aware) to lay out in comprehensive detail the mode and manner of
broadcasting regulation. This level of detail allows the kind of analysis that is impossible
with threadbare outlines and incomplete regulatory aspirations. Second, through its
specificity, the proposal addresses the issues at the heart of the debate and thereby enables
assessment of whether the proposed solutions adequately address the obstacles identified.
These two reasons undergird the in-depth analysis that follows. This Section analyzes the
Bill and evaluates its effectiveness in addressing important obstacles.
a. The Proposal’s Regulatory Framework

The proposal in many ways formalizes existing regulatory practices, but also moves
further to integrate and rationalize the process. For example, the proposal recognizes and
codifies the three traditional sectors of broadcasting: public service, commercial, and
Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241 (recognizing these as the two main tasks); see also
KARIKARI, supra note 328, at 11 (“Essentially, two categories of the elements comprising broadcasting require
one or another form of regulation, namely: the Radio Spectrum (frequency) and the output of Radio
Broadcasting, that is, the content of broadcasting.”)
463 See supra Part V.B (recognizing varying languages, inequalities across the country, limited broadcasting
infrastructure, lack of clear framework for NCA/NMC interaction, cultural/institutional norms, media
consolidation, and foreign investment as obstacles to the full realization of broadcaster’s freedom to share
information).
464 The information concerning the proposal in this section is taken from the 2007 Proposals for a
Broadcasting Act.
462
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community.465 While each sector has unique obligations, rights, and responsibilities, a
common framework undergirds the entire system: The NMC is responsible for all
broadcasting authorization.466 In addition, the NMC grants authorization to operate in one
of the three sectors of broadcast, which presumably means that an authorization cannot
permit a broadcaster to engage in both community and commercial broadcasting, for
example, at the same time.467 The proposal further details the rights and responsibilities of
the three sectors individually.
The public service sector refers to state-owned or wholly state-funded
broadcasting.468 Broadcasters in this sector are insulated from government control or
influence and are free to exercise independence when making editorial decisions.469 With
this freedom comes a responsibility, however, to provide diverse, informative, and
educational programming.470 The proposal also sets strict guidelines on the composition of
the boards of directors. These directors are appointed by the NMC and are responsible for
operating the public service broadcasters.471
Next, the proposal defines commercial broadcasters as “radio and television stations
that are privately owned and operated for profit and controlled privately by independent
commercial groups.”472 These broadcasters have a public interest obligation to provide
diverse programming that highlights Ghanaian culture and identity, some of which must be

Proposal for a Broadcasting Act, 2007, 2.
Id. at 4.
467 Id.
468 Id. at 7.
469 Id. at 7(5).
470 Id. at 7(4).
471 See id. at 9.
472 Id. at 10.
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broadcast in in local languages.473 They must also, within a reasonable time after
authorization, “extend their services to ensure comprehensive coverage of the area for
which they are authorised to provide services.”474 Beyond this, the formal duties of
commercial broadcasters are left largely to later specification by the NMC.
In contrast to the broad definition of commercial broadcasters, community
broadcasters are narrowly defined as “radio and television stations that are about, for, by
and of a specific marginalized community, whose ownership and management are
representative of the community, which pursue a participatory social development agenda,
and which are non-profit, non-partisan and non-sectarian.”475 The proposal lists several
requirements for community broadcasters, including that they steadfastly remain focused
on the needs of their particular marginalized community.476 The proposal further
empowers the NMC to issue minimum coverage requirements for programs in the local
language and for those produced or created by the station or community.477 Moreover,
these broadcasters cannot engage in substantial commercial advertising and must reinvest
surplus revenue back into the venture.478
After establishing the rights and responsibilities of the three sectors, the proposal
turns to regulatory authority. It provides that the NMC shall have the power to grant
frequency authorization and terminate such authorizations.479 In this framework, the NCA’s

Id. at 11.
Id. at 14.
475 Id. at 16.
476 Id. At 18.
477 Id. at 19.
478 Id. at 20–21.
479 Id. at 27.
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authority extends only to technical matters.480 Even after the NCA plans and assigns the
radio frequency spectrum generally, the proposal prescribes that it “shall thereafter assign
the frequencies for broadcasting to the [National Media] Commission.”481 Though the NCA
may terminate an authorization in the face of immediate harm, an appeal from this
termination lies with the NMC.482 In addition to this quasi-appellate authority, the NMC is
tasked with implementing broadcasting standards and regulations. It is empowered to
enforce these standards by appropriate sanctions issued by a special committee
established in the proposal (the Broadcasting Standards and Complaint Committee).483
Finally, the proposal mandates that a National Frequency Plan be established by the NMC
and NCA within six months of the Bill’s passage that includes the number of available
frequencies and plans for their distribution.484
The proposal also requires the NMC to develop a policy on how frequency
authorizations will be made, and to make that policy and its accompanying procedures
publicly available.485 Applicants who meet the listed criteria are to be granted an
authorization, assuming that frequencies are available.486 However, the proposal also
creates several restrictions on ownership and control. No person may be awarded more
than three radio frequencies and one television frequency/channel;487 a foreign person
cannot be awarded a frequency, indirectly or directly control one, or have a majority
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Id. at 28.
482 Id. at 29.
483 Id. at 27, 44. Paragraph 44 lays out a detailed list of reasons for sanctions and the type of sanctions that can
and should accompany violations.
484 Id. at 30.
485 Id. at 36.
486 Id.
487 Id. at 37(1).
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financial interest in a broadcaster;488 and no political party, public official, district
assembly, or religious body can be awarded a frequency.489
b. Evaluating the Proposal

The 2007 proposal answers many of the questions confronting the broadcasting
sector. For example, the proposal incorporates mechanisms to ensure adequate
programming in the local languages;490 addresses inequalities across the country by
prescribing greater radio coverage;491 recognizes the nature of frequencies as a public good
and plans for their equitable distribution;492 provides a clear framework for the interaction
of the NMC and the NCA;493 empowers the NMC to establish guidelines for professional
quality and the disciplinary tools to implement the guideline;494 limits the extent of media
consolidation through a cap on the ownership of frequencies;495 and prohibits foreign
ownership, control, and investment that would undermine Ghanaian independence and
identity.496
Though the proposal addresses most of the obstacles identified in this Report, it
does not adequately resolve all of them. For instance, some critics fault the bill for failing to
take into account changing technological advances, a major element in effective and
efficient regulation moving forward. In particular, as articulated by the NMC Executive
Secretary George Sarpong, “[w]hile the world is going convergence, the bill proposes

Id. at 38(3).
Id. at 38(5)–(6).
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divergence.”497 Technological changes stemming from digitization require a convergence of
broadcasting regulation. The allocation and regulation of broadcasting should not be
distributed individually to one agency while authority over other frequencies is distributed
to another agency. Nor should technical aspects be necessarily separated from granting an
authorization in the first place. Progress in digital technology necessitates that one
agency—like the Federal Communications Authority in the United States—regulate all
communication media. The Bill heavily favors the NMC as the regulatory body in charge,
but leaves much of the technical work to the NCA. So long as the NMC is legally empowered
to issue sanctions for violations of broadcasting standards, the ownership and control of
the frequencies need not be in its hands. More to the point, the proposal isolates particular
broadcasting media, such as television and radio, and develops an independent regulatory
framework for these media without integrating them into the whole telecommunications
sector.
Additionally, other issues that are important in the midst of rapid technological
change are unaddressed. The proposal is silent on important issues between transmission
companies and content producers.498 This is an undeniably important component of
broadcasting regulation in the digital era.499 Yet there is no mention of questions
concerning the relationship between transmission companies and content producers,
including the nature of their legal relationship, limits (if any) on transmission companies’
ability to screen content, and where liability for objectionable content lies. This is one more

Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241.
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499 Id. (recounting the problems with censorship by large transmission companies and the power imbalance
between these companies and smaller content producers).
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reason to think that the proposal lags behind technological progress and the changing
landscape of broadcasting.
Finally, the proposal’s particular segmentation of the broadcasting sector may turn
out to be problematic. The public service and commercial sectors are clear enough, but the
stringent requirements and narrow definition of community broadcasting threaten to leave
out an entire swath of broadcasters: ordinary non-profit broadcasters that may not
exclusively serve marginalized communities, or, even if they do serve these communities,
may not originate from them. There is no role in the proposal for non-commercially owned
and operated private broadcasters that serve a broader audience or purpose than
community broadcasters narrowly defined. While the narrow definition of community
broadcasters serves a noteworthy goal, other kinds of privately owned public interest
broadcasting ought to be cultivated as well.
Table 4. Obstacles and Solutions in the Broadcast Bill
Obstacles Identified

Addressed?

If so, how?

Inequalities across the country

Yes

Lack of a clear policy framework

Yes

Inequitable frequency allocation

Partially

Structural Obstacles

Partially

Extra-Legal Cultural Obstacles

No

The proposal mandates that community broadcasters
produce shows in the local languages, encourages
public interest broadcasters to do so, and requires
commercial broadcasters to comprehensively cover
their authorized access areas
The proposal gives ownership and control of
frequencies to the NMC and empowers the NMC to
authorize and revoke frequencies
The proposal identifies equitable distribution as a
principle guiding frequency allocation, but does not
specify how equitable distribution is to be
determined
The proposal is designed to limit media consolidation
and foreign ownership, but does incorporate
changing technological developments into its
regulatory scheme
---
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VI. Conclusion
Over the last six decades, broadcast and print media have played an important role
in Ghana’s democratic development. Like the colonial rulers that preceded them, postindependence leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and John Rawlings recognized the power
of open access to information and a free press. Viewing information as a governmentcontrolled tool for development, they stifled independent media outlets and maintained
strict control over the state-owned press. The drafting of the 1992 Constitution and the
dawn of the fourth republic ushered in a new age of freedom and democracy. The right to
information, free speech, and a free media was enshrined in Article 21, and the criminal
libel law was eventually abolished. Journalists no longer had to labor under intense fear
and intimidation, citizens could more freely criticize their government.
Today, Ghana can claim enormous successes, but also faces a new set of challenges.
No longer is direct suppression of speech widespread. And yet not all Ghanaians can take
advantage of the rights to hear and be heard. Overcoming this new set of obstacles will
require affirmative actions by the Ghanaian government. Two pieces of legislation in
particular—the Right to Information Bill and the Broadcasting Bill—can serve as
cornerstones for this next stage of development. The goal of this Report is to bring together
the wisdom and insights of a wide range of Ghanaian stakeholders in an effort to help lay
that foundation.
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Appendix I: Schedule and Meeting List
Monday, March 11
• The Media Foundation for West Africa
o Mr. Kwame Karikari, Director
• Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association
o Mr. Gerald Ankrah, Executive Secretary
• Ghana Journalists Association
o Mr. Bright Blewu, President
• Ghana Community Radio Network
o Ms. Wilna Quarmyne, Co-Founder
Tuesday, March 12
• Daily Graphic
o Mr. Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, General Manager of Newspapers
o Mr. Emmanuel Agyei Atha, Public Affairs Coordinator
• Ghana Broadcasting Company (GBC)
o Mr. K. Monney, Director of Radio
• Daily Guide
o Mr. Freddie Blay, Chairman, Daily Guide
o Ms. Gina Ama Blay, C.E.O. of the Western Publications, Ltd.
o Other Editors and Reporters of Daily Guide
Wednesday, March 13
• University of Ghana
o Dr. Margaret Amoakohene, Director, School of Communications
o Ms. Audrey Gadzekpo, Senior Lecturer, School of Communications
• GIMPA Law School
o Mr. Ernest Abotsi, Dean and Professor of Law
o Kwaku Agyeman Budu, Lecturer of Law
Thursday, March 14
• Parliament
o The Honorable Mr. E. Kwasi Bandua, MP, Biakoye, Volta Region
o The Honorable Mr. Alhassan Mumuni, MP, Slaga North, Northern Region
o Mr. Ebenezer Djietror, Principal Assistant Clerk to Parliament
• National Media Commission
o Mr. George Sarpong, Executive Secretary
Friday, March 15
• Ghana Bar Association
o Mr. Nene Amegatcher, President
• Ghana School of Law
o Administrative Officials and Faculty
109

Saturday, March 16
• Radio Ada
o Mr. Isaac Djagbletey, Station Coordinator
• Dogo
o Assemblyman and Village Elders
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Date of enacting
legislation
Coverage

Exemptions

Appendix III: Comparison of Right to Information Statutes500
South Africa
Zimbabwe
United Kingdom
2001
2002
2000
Government bodies
and private bodies
where information
is necessary for the
exercise or
protection of
individual rights
-11 subject-based
categories
-All exemptions
subject to public
interest override

-Government bodies
-Members of the
media must be
registered with the
government to
access information

Over 10,000 public
bodies

-8 subject-based
categories
-Press can be
prosecuted for
“abuse of free
expression”
Yes

3 categories based
on scope of
exemption:
Absolute, qualified,
and limited
exemption
No fee if production
cost is less than
£600 for central
government body
and £450 for local
government body
Public body must
respond within 20
days
-First review:
Public body
-Appeal:
Information
Commissioner
-Second appeal:
Information
Tribunal
-Third Appeal:
High Court of
Justice
Information
Commissioner

Fees?

Yes

Time frame

Government agency
must respond in 30
days
-First review:
Cabinet minister
-Appeal: Court
system

Government agency
must respond in 30
days
-First review:
Government body
-Appeal: Media and
Information
Commission
-Second appeal:
Administrative
court

South African
Human Rights
Commission
-Criminal fines for
those who destroy
records
-Government bodies
must publish access
guides providing
contact information

Media and
Information
Commission
-Widely criticized
as an instrument of
speech suppression
and media control
-Almost no citizen
right of access in
practice

Appeals

Enforcement

Miscellaneous

500

See generally Banisar, supra note 162.
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-Some categories of
information
automatically
released
-All public bodies
have access guides
providing contact
information

India
2005
Government bodies
at national, state,
and local level and
private bodies
substantially
funded by the
government
-14 subject-based
categories
-All exemptions
subject to public
interest override
Yes

Public body must
respond within 30
days
-First review:
Public body
-Appeal: Senior
public interest
officer (additional
internal review)
-Second appeal:
Information
Commission

Information
Commission
-Fines for refusing,
obstructing, or
delaying access to
requested
information
-Highly
decentralized;
states have most
power
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